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ABSTRACT

Douglas, Dan. M.A., School of Public and International Affairs, International and Comparative
Politics Graduate Program, Wright State University, 2017.
Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping: A Trait Analysis

This study uses Margaret Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) to compare Mao Zedong and
Xi Jinping and see if they have the same style. Through a content analysis of a leader’s speeches,
researchers can gain insight into a leader’s motivation for obtaining office and power. In the course
of this research, 167 speeches by Mao, and 79 Speeches by Xi were inputted into the content
analysis program Profiler+ (Hermann, 2003). The analysis showed that Mao and Xi have some
similarities in their LTA results, but the differences in their scores indicate different approaches to
leadership. An analysis of the context of a sample of speeches indicated that Mao was more likely to
break society into groups and to be distrustful of others than Xi. The research concludes, Mao was a
revolutionary and Xi is a bureaucrat and they utilize different leadership styles in response to their
environments.
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Ch. 1: Literature Review and Methods
Introduction
Political scientists have long analyzed elites. Elite studies, stemming from the work of
Mosca (1939) and Pareto (1935), often look at the divisions between the ruling class and the
ruled and what it means to be an elite in society (Pitcurca, 2012; Zuckerman, 1977).
Additionally, scholars examine how societal divisions affect the decisions of political leaders
(O’Rouke, Hogan, & Donnelly, 2015). This research area can highlight the norms of creating
elites in society and how those individuals can act in certain situations.
Scholarship on Chinese politics has often included an elite focus, in part due to the
limited flow of information from the communist state, combined with the authoritarian system
and a lack of extensive limits on elites (Bo, 2008; Feng, 2005; Li, 2001; Nathan, 1973).
Leadership turnover and changes in the makeup of political bodies can reveal much about the
state of affairs for the country (Meyer, Ram, & Wilke, 2016; Shih, 2016). In elite studies, some
have analyzed speeches from Core Leaders (Feng, 2005), and others the makeup of the
governing bodies (Bo, 2004).
Titles are important in China, as seen in the usage of the title of “Core Leader.” The
position of “Core Leader” within China refers to the individual that holds three important
positions. For the current norm in Chinese politics the Core Leader must be the Chairman of the
Central Military Commission (CMC), Secretary-General of the CCP and president of the PRC.
This hasn’t always been true and isn’t always cut and dry. Mao was the Chairman of these
organizations and he didn’t hold all of them during his entire career, but he still held the supreme
leader status until his death. Deng was also a special case for the idea of core, he held the three
necessary positions at one point, but he also carried a lot of power when he held no official titles
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and began transitioning power to Jiang Zemin while still retaining full control. Additionally,
Jiang held on to power long after his tenure and continues to influence politics especially in the
region surrounding Shanghai. The use of the Core Leader answers the need for collective
leadership, but still allows the authoritarian leader which has been an important part of the CCP
holding power in the PRC (Teiwes, 2001; Lampton, 2014).
Table 1.1 Core Leader positions
CMC Chair

CCP Secretary
General

PRC President

Mao Zedong

1954 – 1976

(Chairman)
1943 – 1976

1954 – 1959

Deng Xiaoping

1981 – 1989

Jiang Zemin

1989 – 2004

1989 – 2002

1993 – 2003

Hu Jintao

2004 – 2012

2002 – 2012

2003 – 2013

Xi Jinping

2012 –

2012 –

2013 –

The Core Leader is an institutional norm in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which
was originally put forward by Deng Xiaoping, in 1989, to strengthen Jiang Zemin’s grasp on the
leadership (Cho, 2008; Miller, 2016, 2014; Teiwes, 2001). This title was used to separate Jiang
from the other positions of power in the country. Previous generations did not use this
distinction, but foreign scholars have retroactively applied the title to them. Deng Xiaoping
stated that Mao Zedong was the core of the first generation, declared himself the core of the
second generation and then offered Jiang as the core of the third generation. Jiang capitalized on
the Core Leader title to differentiate himself from the premiers and presidents that served under
past leaders, and to further legitimize his ascension to the top spot (Li, 2001). He also used the
title to make it difficult for Hu Jintao to succeed Jiang when his predecessor’s term was officially
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over. Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping both commonly referred to their positions as General Secretary
but, they are both the Core Leaders for their generations (Lam, 2006, 2015; Lampton, 2014; Tien
& Chu, 2000).
How can we characterize the “Core Leaders” of the PRC? What impact do their
personality characteristics have on their leadership and governing style? Leadership trait analysis
(LTA) may provide helpful insights into the political landscape of China. Using this approach on
Chinese leaders can help illuminate some of the workings of an elite recruitment system that is
largely shrouded in secrecy. Using methods detailed by Hermann (2003), Gorener & Ucal
(2011), and Cottam & Preston (2007), this research will create general profiles of Mao Zedong
(CCP leader from 1949-1976) and Xi Jinping (CCP General Secretary from 2012- present).
These profiles can then be compared to determine how similar, or different, these two Core
Leaders are.
Xi Jinping and Mao Zedong have often been compared; researchers and other observers
view Xi Jinping as return to the style of Mao Zedong (Lam, 2015; Miller, 2014, 2016; Zhao,
2016). If Xi is as comparable to Mao as this would suggest, then Xi Jinping may not be as
willing to give up power at the end of his term and Xi may try to break other institutional
limitations on his position to give himself more control over the PRC.
Background on Chinese Leadership
China’s post-Deng leaders could be considered transactional leaders going from resolving
one conflict to another (Lampton, 2014). The PRC has moved from the strong leadership of Mao
and Deng with a highly centralized government and less power in lower levels of society to a
society with less powerful top officials and more empowered lower levels of society. Past the socalled reform era, generally viewed as 1978-1990, leaders are more restrained by norms and
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focused on maintaining the system than on revolutionary movements (Lampton, 2014). Some
scholars and journalists have indicated that Xi Jinping is returning to Maoist ideology (Miller,
2014, 2016). Scholars contend that Xi breaks the mold of the “first among equals” mindset of the
Core Leader. Xi has a belief in “Chinese Exceptionalism” (Lam, 2015, pg. 270), commonly
characterized as the view that China can get what it wants without being burdened by
international norms. Xi’s rise to the role of Core Leader has changed the position to be closer to
what it was in the Mao era (Lam, 2015).
Mao Zedong’s era (1949-1976) was defined by war and revolution. Mao cultivated a
nation of followers more than having a well educated country stating that it was “better red than
expert” (Lampton, 2014, pg. 24). At the start of Mao’s leadership of the PRC, he labeled those
who supported the revolution as “people” and those who did not as “non-people” showing an
early start to his separations of society (Karl, 2010, pgs. 74-75). Mao ostracized those who
disagreed with him, especially intellectuals; in most cases he would label those who disagree as
counter-revolutionaries and have them arrested (Karl, 2010). Mao was set in his decisions, even
those that starved millions and his staunch beliefs in his policies would continue even when
results proved to be disastrous (Karl, 2010; Lampton, 2014; Teiwes, 2001). Mao wanted an
independent China free from reliance on foreign markets, and he can be categorized as a
transformational and charismatic leader (Lampton, 2014).
Xi Jinping’s stated goal, captured by the “Chinese Dream,” is to return the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) to the strength it once knew under Mao. He returned power to the top
spot by spreading nationalistic ideals. He may not be able to return all the power to the Core
Leader, with the power resting on a single charismatic leader like Mao, but he has worked to
increase the power to the top spot. Xi’s ideology has communist, nationalist, and Leninist tones
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to it (Zhao, 2016, p. 83) and Western officials contend that Xi’s policies are similar to that of
Mao, and worry that these positions may bring anti-western sentiments with them (Miller, 2014;
Zhao, 2016).
Since consolidating both State and Party power in 2013, Xi has been attempting to further
control the media. He believes that the media and the state should have the same message and
stated that the party should place more control over the media. He also created a governing body
to control information on the Internet (Zhao, 2016). These methods of controlling the flow of
information show an increase in the desire for the CCP to have a stronger grasp on the daily lives
of Chinese citizens. This is similar to the control that was exacted during the Mao years.
Xi Jinping counters changes that Deng implemented to give more power to himself as the
top official. Xi uses strongman tactics to gain as much power as possible; some liken his tactics
to those of Mao. As a lower level official, Xi investigated corruption in the Ningde district of
Fujian leading to 7,300 cadres being prosecuted. This led to Xi being known as a “conqueror of
corrupt officials” (Lam, 2015, pg. 46). Xi was viewed as a politician of the people when he was a
provincial cadre and never had a problem with getting the people on his side. When he became
the Core Leader of the fifth generation, in 2012, Xi created several new sub-branches of the CCP
which helped him gain control of the police force and the economy. This lowers the amount that
current institutions can limit Xi’s power. Xi’s Chinese Dream policies display his nationalistic
tendency. Finally, Xi instituted practices to suppress Uighur minorities in an attempt to calm
tensions in Xinjiang Province (Lam, 2015).
Literature review
The study of leadership trait analysis, originated by Margaret Hermann, utilizes content
analysis to examine the underlying meanings behind speeches being given by world leaders.
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Content analysis is a useful method in measuring characteristics of political leaders who are not
likely to sit for testing (Hermann, 1980). To date, LTA has not been previously utilized on
Chinese leaders. This approach has been used to study leaders in other authoritarian contexts to
create profiles of leaders based on speeches they have given (Herman, 2001, 2003; Hermann,
Preston, Korany & Shaw 2001; Young & Hermann, 2014).
Qualitative features are considered when studying individuals in leadership positions
(Chen, 2012; Lam, 2015; Robinson, 1972; Zeng, 2013). Researchers consider the individual’s
actions in the context of history and with the constraints they have in their position. Some
compare the individual’s qualifications to the aggregate scores of the larger body of their peers to
see what makes them stand out from the rest (Robinson, 1972). Researchers analyze the
characteristics that made those who achieved higher levels of power stand out (Zeng, 2013;
Robinson, 1972). Qualitative analysis assesses how leaders act in a situation while considering
what the leader has said or how they have acted in similar situations. These analyses can be very
critical of leaders and how they reach their policy decisions (Chen, 2012; Lam, 2015; Robinson,
1972).
Studies using LTA consider how the results of the analysis will affect policy decisions.
One tool of this analysis which can have a direct effect on policy decisions is whether or not a
leader respects or challenges constraints. Studies have been done on how a leader handles
constraints and how this affects their decision making process (Hermann, 2003; Keller, 2005;
Shannon & Keller, 2007). A constraint is something in the leader’s environment that inhibits
them from performing a certain task. Constraints have many different forms. They can be
institutional norms or rules set forth in a legal document such as a constitution. Public opinion
can also be a constraint, especially in democracies. When working in the international
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environment other countries’ desires can constrain the movement of a leader as well. Other
potential constraints are those that do not directly limit a leader’s actions but can discourage it.
The strength of this type of constraint is dependent on how the leader perceives it and its
consequences. Additionally, direct constraints are those that directly limit a leader’s actions
although, these are seen as rare (Dyson, 2007; Keller, 2005, 2005b).
Keller (2005) shows that leaders who respect constraints will internalize constraints that
they face and those that challenge constraints will see them as obstacles that stand in the way of
their goals. The author uses at-a-distance measures to analyze select personality traits such as
need for power and cognitive complexity as indicators of whether a leader will challenge or
respect constraints. They determine if a leader is more task-focused or relationship focused
influences how they will handle constraints in their environments. The author argues that there
are variations in how leaders respond to domestic constraints and leadership style is one source
of that variation.
Restraint challengers can be more aggressive in their policy making decisions and this
can come out in their responses to crises. Constraint challengers are more likely to use violence
as a response to domestic crises even in events that begin non-violently (Dyson, 2007; Keller,
2005b). These leaders may also be more willing to break international norms when facing
international conflicts (Shannon & Keller, 2007). During important situations the orientation of
the leader toward constraints will be an important indicator of how decisions will be made
(Dyson, 2007).
A leader’s openness to information can affect how he or she handles policy decisions. A
leader who comes into office with a set agenda and a belief that he or she is the only person who
can get a certain outcome, is less likely to seek outside information. These leaders are more
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likely to gather information that agrees with their original opinions than to look at other points of
view. Leaders who are more open to information will be more likely to seek out the opinions of
other important leaders or constituencies before reaching a decision (Hermann, Preston, Korany
& Shaw, 2001; Hermann, 2003).
Leaders can be motivated by internal or external needs. They can either be motivated by a
desire to see a certain result or they can be motivated by gaining the approval of others or certain
groups. Leaders who are internally motivated will seek to win others over to their position and
seek to motivate and mobilize others to reach their goal. Those who are externally motivated will
be more flexible in their positions and will look to win the approval of others (Hermann, Preston,
Korany & Shaw, 2001; Hermann, 2003; Jervis, 2013).
Operational code and leadership trait analysis are similar in methods, but vary in what is
displayed. Leadership trait analysis is better suited at creating a profile of the leader under study
in contrast operational code analysis is trying to determine what a leader’s beliefs are.
Operational code analysis was developed under the assumption that a leader has a political belief
system that has some things that guide the leaders understanding of the context of an event and
other beliefs that are used to develop a strategy to solve an issue or obtain goals. The operational
code analysis uses content analysis to display those beliefs (Walker, Schafer & Young, 2003).
Researchers making operational codes use the computer program Verbs in Context System
(VICS). VICS is used to analyze the use of verbs and create a map of the speech givers political
beliefs or an operational code.
Operational codes can be very helpful in creating a map of how an individual reached a
decision or a group of decisions in a set amount of time, but outside of the time of the speeches
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analyzed have very little predictive power. An individual’s belief is not static and can change
over time and in different situations making operational codes hard to generalize (Feng, 2005).
Operational code analysis can help in understanding a leader’s motivations in certain
situations. The speeches can be broken up into topics to create an operational code on how a
leader acts in a certain situation. For example, a researcher could determine what Xi Jinping’s
beliefs on foreign policy with other countries are (He & Feng, 2013). This can also be helpful in
seeing how a leader’s stance on something, like a country or policy, has changed after an event
like a war or an internal crisis (Feng, 2005, 2005b; He & Feng, 2013).
Studies utilizing operational code analysis on the Core Leaders of China are quantitative
in nature and use content analysis to create an operational code of leaders (Feng, 2005, 2005b;
He & Feng, 2013). Using the VICS system the authors create operational codes and compare the
Core Leaders to one another. From a psychological standpoint the central leaders in China
impact the direction of policy more than the lower members of the government, and therefore
should be given more weight when considering leadership styles. Feng (2005) conducted a
content analysis of speeches made by the Core Leaders to determine the overall goals of the PRC
at different points in time. These operational codes can give more insight into the inner workings
of the PRC.
LTA has been used to create working profiles on leaders all over the world, but has yet to
be applied to the Core Leaders of China. It has been used to identify under what circumstances a
leader will act as a predominant leader, or the sole decision unit. By making profiles of leaders
from different nations using speeches and comparing these profiles to certain situations where
they acted as the chief decision maker. This approach has been used on American leaders; it has
also been used on leaders from authoritarian nations where information was not as available
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(Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001). This shows how versatile this method can be and the
explanatory power it can bring to a political situation like the PRC.
To date, scholars relied on family and occupational history to gain insight into what
might shape a Chinese leader’s actions (Lam, 2006, 2015; Li, 2001; Yu, 2012). This could
highlight information on how a leader will act, but any assessment made from this would be
qualitative in nature and lacks an ability to control for other factors that could influence a
leader’s decision (Yu, 2012). Using these at-a-distance measures could help lead research on
Chinese leaders and what traits they possess that they potentially reference when they make a
decision.
One qualitative study on Xi Jinping as the new leader of the PRC examines how his
political position has been shaped by his family heritage and other characteristics (Yu, 2012). Yu
compares Xi Jinping to his father, Xi Zhongxun, the famed revolutionary who was purged from
the party in the fifties spending several years in prison only to later return to favorability and
finish his career in Beijing. Yu examines how Xi Jinping’s background will affect his policies to
determine what kind of leader Xi will be. The author argues that Xi will be a leader similar to
Deng Xiaoping in his efforts to lead the CCP in new directions.
The leading approach to elite politics in China is the factional approach. Members of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCCCP) can be traced back to certain
groups that researchers call factions. Links to these groups can help identify the policies that they
will make and how their actions will be guided by this grouping (Nathan, 1973). Membership in
a group is based on the past experiences of a leader and developed networks. For example,
members of the so-called Shanghai Clique used positions in Shanghai and the surrounding areas
to come to power (Bo, 2008). Determining group boundaries and membership often requires
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some subjective analysis when considering how members know each other as well as how strong
the connection is.
Nathan (1973) and Bo (2004, 2008) emphasize the role that factions play in Chinese
politics. These scholars contend that policy is dictated by the faction leaders belong to.
Researchers analyze the CCCCP looking to see what factions have the most members and hold
the most power to determine the direction of the country (Bo, 2004, 2008; Feng, 2005; Nathan,
1973).
Some studies create a quantitative system to rate an individual’s membership in a faction.
For example, when studying the Qinghua Clique, a group of elites who attended the prestigious
university in Beijing, different criteria can be employed to decide who qualifies as a member. In
Bo’s system of analysis only individuals who went to Qinghua University and were in the school
at the same time are considered members of this group. When groups are identified, quantitative
analysis of the CCCCP is conducted to determine which group has the most power. Individual
group power is mainly determined by the number of CCCCP members who qualify as a member
of the faction. Researchers also strive to determine what relationships between members exist by
looking at the histories of the leadership to determine connections (Bo, 2004, 2008; Nathan,
1973).
Factional changes in the CCCCP are studied closely to see which groups have the most
power in congress when the CCCCP resumes. This can show the directional heading of the CCP
during these times. As one group decreases in power, other groups will increase their power and
this restructuring can show how changes in the country will happen. This is especially true when
a new Core Leader is close to being chosen (Bo, 2004, 2008).
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Consideration of factional struggles and changes to the leadership can be helpful in
understanding changes in Chinese politics in the future (Goldstein, 1994). Factional struggles can
show the dynamics of the next leadership structure. In 2008, Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai Clique was
struggling with Hu Jintao’s Communist Youth League leading to Xi Jinping’s gang of
Princelings to be able to take power ultimately leading to Xi’s eventual elevation to the level of
“Core Leader” (Bo, 2008; Lam, 2009).
Some contend that as factions progress, the power of the Core Leader will diminish in
Chinese society (Bo, 2004; Cho, 2008). Additionally, Cho (2008) argues that with a new
“collective leadership” being developed in Chinese politics China’s “Core Leader” will be a
“first among equals” (pg. 160) and not as the sole voice of the party. This indicates that the
future growth of the CCCCP’s power in Chinese politics may undermine that of the “Core
Leader.”
Researchers believe that leaders in the PRC will work with the people they know
throughout their careers for advancement, but they also indicate that power will change over time
and these relationships will change with it (Nathan & Tsai, 1995; Tsou, 1995; Cho, 2008;
Fewsmith, 2008). What they determine is most important for elites in China are not the laws and
regulations but what people they know (Fewsmith, 1996).
Factionalism implies an unchanging adherence between certain groups of leaders, which
is especially tied to a single leader with the faction being unable to “survive its leader” (Nathan,
1973, pg. 43). The main criticism of factionalism is that the groups that develop in the CCCCP
are not as fixed as the research suggests. The informal connections between leaders are important
in the study of leadership in China, but they may not follow the rigid boundaries that the
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factionalism model presents. The power may oscillate between different leaders at different
times (Fewsmith, 1996, 2008).
Individuals coming from similar areas with the same or similar affiliations and career
backgrounds may be a good source of identifying members of a specific faction. However, it
does not seem to affect how a specific faction will act or what position that faction will take. The
aspirations of any one individual may be a better indicator of how they will behave in a given
situation (Evans, 1982; Fewsmith, 1996; Lieberthal, 2001).
Factions may have varying levels of cohesion. Some groups have very little contact
between members prior to membership in the CCCCP (Bo, 2004, 2008). On the other hand,
some of these connections are very strong. The groups that have the highest levels of power,
including Xi’s gang of Princelings, are also the groups with the lowest levels of overall cohesion
(Bo, 2008; Lam, 2015). This indicates that the factional approach may not have very high levels
of reliability. These groups may exist but there is little guarantee that the members of a certain
group will always adhere to the goals of that group (Zeng, 2013).
Under the one party system in the PRC, the loyalties of individual leaders is difficult to
identify and can be subjective (Zeng, 2013). The study of any country where deals are being
struck behind closed doors can be difficult to determine why an individual leader is acting one
way or another. In China any deal being made is in no way a permanent one and could easily
change when the political landscape shifts (Cho, 2008; Goldstein, 1994; Zeng, 2013).
The factional approach could be a good starting point for studies on Chinese politics, but
it fails to explain every aspect that should be taken into consideration (Nathan, 1973).
Factionalism can help explain some of the changes in the structure of power in China. When Hu
Jintao was working to establish an heir he had resistance within the CCCCP. The committee
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members viewed the Hu era as a disappointment (Li, 2012) and worked to block his
recommendations leading to the ascension of Xi Jinping (Fewsmith, 2008). This can be
explained best with a factional model and if these power struggles continue then the factions in
the Chinese parties may matter more than the individual leaders or even the “Core Leaders.”
Each of these methodologies has various strengths and weaknesses for researching
politics in the PRC. For example, Operational Code has difficulty in being applied across time
and in different situations (Feng, 2005). Additionally, the factional method has difficulty in
showing the true strength of connections between members (Zeng, 2013). Leadership Trait
Analysis has its own strengths and weaknesses as well, but it could be helpful in revealing
information on leaders that is not readily available. Using this method to compare Mao Zedong
and Xi Jinping could show how these leaders’ styles are similar or different.
Research Design
China has had five Core Leaders since 1949 when Mao declared the foundation of the
PRC on the edge of the Forbidden City and Tiananmen Square (Karl, 2010). This event made
Mao the Chairman of the PRC, a role he held until his death in 1976 and this title has not been
used for any other CCP leader since. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping all
followed Mao as leaders of the PRC and all of these figures were considered the “Core Leaders”
of their respective generations, either retroactively or for research purposes (Miller, 2014;
Lampton, 2014; Zhao, 2016). Although each of these leaders had qualities that would make each
interesting to study individually, a comparison of the current Core Leader to Mao Zedong creates
interesting implications for the future of the CCP and the PRC. Researchers and journalists have
often called Xi’s style a return to Mao (Lam, 2015; Lampton, 2014; Miller, 2014; Zhao, 2016.)
This claim is the focus of this study.
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The PRC is a country that information on the leadership and ruling bodies is scarce. This
lack of data still holds true for current researchers in the field (Lam, 2006; Shih, 2016; Tien &
Chu, 2000). One of the areas that has been of special interest to study is the country’s political
bodies. Using at-a-distance measures to examine the leadership is a viable option to gain more
insight into the CCP.
Leadership trait analysis is known to reveal the most valid results when materials come
from sources that are a mixture of spontaneous and rehearsed (Dyson & Preston, 2006; Hermann,
2003; Schafer & Crichlow, 2000). Having a good mixture of these materials will help in
controlling for speeches having been written by a speech writer or directed to a specific
audience. In most cases the spontaneous and rehearsed speeches are analyzed separately and the
two analyses are compared to locate the differences. However, in a country like China, obtaining
those spontaneous instances can be fairly challenging (He & Feng, 2013). This method can still
be helpful when these instances are not available and can still acquire important information
about the leadership.
Leadership trait analysis works on the assumption that leaders will use certain words
more frequently when the content is the most salient to them. The software Profiler+ can perform
this analysis giving the data necessary to create a profile of the leader with 100 percent intercoder reliability (Hermann, 2003). These profiles are then compared to a bank of profiles on
world leaders to see how they compare. This is a quantitative measure and can be helpful when
comparing multiple leaders in similar situations (Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann & Hermann, 2001;
Hermann, 2001; Hermann, Preston, Korany, & Shaw, 2001). With this information the scores for
Mao and Xi can be compared.
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Leadership trait analysis measures seven variables: (1) The belief that a leader can
control what happens (BACE), (2) The need for power (PWR), (3) Conceptual complexity (CC),
(4) Self-confidence (SC), (5) The focus on problem solving over relationship building (TASK),
(6) The distrust of others (DIS), and (7) Whether an individual holds in-group biases (IGB).
These variables can be considered together to determine whether the leader holds certain traits.
The variables BACE and PWR will show whether that leader is more or less likely to challenge
constraints. CC and SC show how open to information that leader will be. IGB, DIS and TASK
will give insight into what motivates a leader (Hermann, 2003).
For LTA results a leader will be considered high in a trait if their score falls above one
standard deviation above the mean. Scores below one standard deviation below the mean are
considered low. Scores are average if it does not fall either one standard deviation above or
below the mean (Hermann, 2003).
If a leader is high in BACE and PWR then that leader will be more likely to challenge
constraints (Hermann, 2003); these leaders know what needs to happen and are willing to do
whatever it takes to accomplish those goals, these leaders are also more skilled in their
movements knowing exactly how to get what they want. If low in each, then they are more likely
to respect the constraints, these leaders will work to build consensus on issues and work in the
parameters of the position. When a leader scores highly on BACE and low on PWR they will
still challenge constraints but, they will do so in a less effective way not being able to manipulate
others as well. When a leader scores highly on PWR and low on BACE, they will also challenge
constraints but they will be more comfortable in a behind the scenes position where they do not
have to take credit for their actions (Hermann, 2003).
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Leaders who score higher on CC than SC will be more open to contextual information
being able to take cues from the environment on what type of action is most acceptable in a
given situation. Those who have a higher SC rating than CC will be more closed in their thinking
they will come in with preconceived notions and follow them through even if they lack public
support. If high in both indicators they will be more open and strategic in their decision making.
TASK, DIS, and IGB are all variables that help with determining a leader’s motivations for
assuming office. TASK show the reasons for seeking office. DIS and IGB show the leader’s
group identification (Hermann, 2003).
This method uses word frequencies to determine where a leader falls for each variable
when compared to the norm group. The BACE variable is coded by looking at frequencies of
verbs which indicate the speaker or a group the speaker identifies with is taking responsibility for
an action. The PWR variable is coded by looking at frequencies of verbs that indicate that the
speaker is taking action to “establish, maintain, or restore his or her power” (Hermann, 2003, pg.
190). The SC variable is coded by looking at the use of pronouns such as “my, myself, I, me, and
mine” such as: “I am going to…” and “if it were up to me…” (Hermann, 2003, pg. 196). A score
is created by looking at the frequency of these words in a given speech. The CC variable is
focused on words expressing the speaker’s ability to see different dimensions to an issue or those
words showing the speaker only sees a narrow set of options. A speaker who is low in CC would
use words such as: Absolutely, without a doubt, certainly, and irreversible. A speaker high in CC
would use words such as: approximately, possibility, trend, and for example. The TASK variable
is coded by examining specific words centered on completing a task or building a relationship.
Scores for this variable are the number of task specific words compared to the total number of
task and relationship building words in the speech being examined. Examples of task oriented
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words are: accomplishment, achieve, plan, position, proposal, recommendation, and tactic.
Examples of words that indicate building relationships are: appreciation, amnesty, collaboration,
disappoint, forgive, harm, liberation, and suffering. The IGB variable looks at how references to
the speaker’s group are made, if the words associated with the speaker’s group indicate strength
or a need to maintain identity then that speaker shows an in-group bias. Examples of words that
indicate IGB are: progressive, successful, prosperous, powerful, and showing a need to defend
our borders. Scores for this variable are a percentage of times the speaker makes these
references. The final variable, DIS, is coded by examining a speaker’s remarks toward others and
coding them for “doubt, uneasiness, misgiving and wariness” (Hermann, 2003, pg. 202) towards
another group.
Additionally, a qualitative comparison will be made between key speeches of Mao’s and
Xi’s. The analysis of these speeches will be to look at the similarities and differences in the use
of rhetoric, the context of the speeches and other identifying aspects of the speeches. The goal
will be to find areas of key speeches for each leader and see how their handling of similar topics
compares or contrasts. These results can be compared to the results of the leadership trait
analysis to see if they are speaking in ways that upholds or refutes the results of that analysis.
Finally, the actions of each leader will be considered. The goal of this section will be to
see how these leaders’ actions compare to one-another. Do the actions of Xi Jinping truly
compare to those of Mao Zedong? These will also be compared to the previous sections to see
how all of these compare to one-another. This will give insight into each individual’s style and
can reveal where Mao and Xi compare and where they contrast.
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Expected Findings
This research will look into this question to determine the similarities and differences
between Xi’s and Mao’s leadership styles. Comparing events in these leaders’ lives to the
variables used in leadership trait analysis can show an interesting comparison between the two.
Running the analysis will provide if these original comparisons hold true and will answer the
question of whether or not these two leaders’ styles compare.

H1: Xi Jinping and Mao Zedong have similar leadership styles.

Mao Zedong: Based on events from Mao’s time as the leader of the PRC, Mao will have
high ratings in the belief that he can control events and need for power. Considering how Mao
rarely vacillated in his decisions, he will also show high ratings in self-confidence. His policy
making decisions suggest that he will be low to moderate in conceptual complexity. He is more
task focused than oriented towards building relationships, Mao appeared to be working toward
his goals with little regard to others’ points of view. His position on foreign involvement in
China suggests that he will have a high in-group bias and his actions to quell coups shows his
high distrust of others (Karl, 2010; Lampton, 2014).
Xi Jinping: Xi Jinping creating new institutions to give himself more control over the
functions of the country shows his high levels in his belief he can control events as well as his
need for power. Xi doesn’t look for many opinions when he is making decisions showing a high
rating in self-confidence. His policy decision making process shows that he ranks toward the
middle in conceptual complexity. He is more task focused than looking to build relationships.
Xi’s nationalistic tendency and actions against the ethnic minorities of China shows a high level
of in-group bias (Lam, 2015; Zhao, 2016).
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Chapter Outline
Chapter 2 will explain the role of elites in the CCP and the role of the Core Leader in
China. This chapter will express how the Core Leaders of China rose to power and how each
leader has shaped the direction of the PRC and the leadership within the CCP. It will also show
how factions affect the political process in China. Chapter 3 will display the results from the
leadership trait analysis and will compare Xi Jinping and Mao Zedong, using content analysis
software. In Chapter 4 qualitative analysis of major speeches from Mao and Xi will be conducted
to compare how each leader handles similar topics. Chapter 5 will analyze what this comparison
has revealed and will included historical facts from each of these leaders’ tenure as helmsman to
see if these results matter compared to actual behavior and institutional restrictions.
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Chapter 2: Elites in the CCP
Introduction
There has long been debate whether individual leaders matter in Chinese politics
(Blanchard, 2015). Chinese politics is a consensus system and the Core Leader has been
commonly seen as a first among equals in a system where building consensus is regarded as
more important than the individual (Li, 2001). Current politicians lack the revolutionary
background of the Mao and Deng eras. This has changed how Chinese politics work; instead of
purging the opposition, leaders have to work to create consensus and reach compromises when
working on important issues (Cho, 2008). Elites serve important roles in Chinese politics either
through an individual’s profile creating legitimacy for the regime, or through the individual’s
influence and interaction with other institutions (Gueorguiev & Schuler, 2016; Liao, 2016).
China’s leadership has shown that the differences between individuals can lead to very
different interactions in the international arena and in domestic affairs. Mao Zedong (1949-1976)
held near total control over all aspects of the country when he was in power, with policies that
kept the PRC isolated from much of the rest of the world. When leadership passed to Deng
Xiaoping (1978~1993) the PRC took a new direction towards opening to the rest of the world,
and China emerged from isolation. Deng Xiaoping also implemented institutional norms
designed to limit the development of a personality cult and help personalize politics. Now, with
Xi Jinping in the leadership role, more changes have occurred with regards to the PRC’s
handling of domestic and foreign affairs (Blanchard, 2015; Liao, 2016).
High profile elites are important in authoritarian regimes. They can add support for the
regime and add to their legitimacy to govern and this support can be helpful for the government
to hold power with these leaders gaining public support for party policy. Additionally, for these
reasons they cannot ignore all members with high amounts of public support and generally do
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not, as long as these individuals are not attempting to rock the boat (Gueorguiev & Schuler,
2016). This causes leaders to promote those who have a profile that is large enough to generate
support but also not too big to be a threat to top officials.
The threat of individuals can be limited by institutional norms leading to individual elites
playing a limited role in the governmental process. Limitations on power, constitutions, as well
as how the public views the government can restrict how much power an individual can have in a
given situation. Structural approaches argue that institutional constraints and incentives can make
the individual differences between leaders matter very little (Blanchard, 2015).
Norms restrict leaders by defining whether an action is acceptable or not. When a norm
constrains a leader he or she will either accept that constraint or that leader will look to challenge
it. Depending on the situation leaders will either violate a norm or be constrained by it, this
behavior varies depending on the situation and what a leader perceives to gain from the violation.
Some leaders will stick to their initial beliefs and will see norms and constraints as obstacles that
stand in the way of their policy and will work to get around them. Elites within authoritarian
regimes can have greater freedom when it comes to violating norms due to the fact that these
leaders do not rely on public opinion alone to hold power like in a democratic society. These
elites are only restricted by other elites, not the public (Hermann, 2001; Shannon & Keller,
2007).
Institutional norms have been increasing in Chinese politics since Deng Xiaoping began
introducing them late in his era as Core Leader (Cho, 2008). Institutionalization has had a strong
effect on party politics. Age (over the age of 67) and term limits (two terms in the same position)
have been applied since 2002 and this greater rotation of positions, as well as more transparent
policies for the selection of party cadres, along with increases in party meetings. These changes
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have helped the party function more smoothly. These have also helped decrease the volatility of
the party when it comes to factional struggles (Cho, 2008).
Institutional norms keep elite conflicts minimized to minor factional struggles and they
protect the legitimacy of the one party system. Without these norms, factional affiliations could
easily result in visible splits within legislatures, which could lead to the destruction of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The institutional norms that have been built since the Deng era
are designed to keep elites in check within the current framework of the system. These norms
limit the power that elites have and keep factional struggles from causing damage to the system
(Gueorguiev & Schuler, 2016; Ma, 2016; Tsou, 1995).
Institutionalization can increase the amount of power sharing in government and in the
CCP it has made power balancing between elites possible. Institutionalization has also made it so
higher positions mean more power and has increased the amount of influence that an individual
elite can have on the political system (Bo 2007; Joo, 2013). This also made norms and rules for a
set retirement age of 67 which has made political purges less necessary and increased the amount
of influence younger legislatures have by increasing turnover of the older elite (Ma, 2016)
Factions serve an important purpose when it comes to power sharing and when important
decisions are happening in the CCP. These groups can often band together to achieve outcomes
that they agree on such as the promotion of a member of their group to a higher level of
government. These ties are normally informal, but can generate influence and lead to promotions
through factional loyalty. These connections can also give researchers a general idea of where an
individual’s loyalties lie (Tsou, 1995).
Deng Xiaoping’s institutionalization of retirement norms benefitted the children of highranking cadres. This norm makes it easy for a high ranking official to retire and then be replaced
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by their politically involved children. This group is referred to as the “princelings” (Li, 2016)
and is the group that Xi Jinping belongs to. The princelings are a growing group in Chinese
politics especially since a member of this group is the current Core Leader. The relatives and
children of China’s senior leaders have been a common area to recruit from in the Chinese
political system (Li, 2001).
Due to the rise in technical training among elites in China, the “Qinghua Clique” became
a prominent faction in Chinese politics. Members of the Qinghua Clique all attended the same
prestigious university in Beijing, known for its expertise in science and engineering. Qinghua
University is also known for being the university where the Red Guard movement was started in
the 1960s, during the Cultural Revolution. Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping both attended Qinghua,
although neither leader is seen as a leading member of this group and instead have stronger ties
to other factional groups (Li, 2001).
The “Shanghai Clique” is the faction, most associated with Jiang Zemin, who promoted it
throughout his tenure as Core Leader of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (1989-2002).
This group refers to individuals who rose to power from their prior positions in Shanghai,
China’s provincial level city. Jiang Zemin was mayor (1985) and party secretary in Shanghai
(1985) before he became the leader of the PRC in 1989. The term Shanghai Clique was used as a
semi-derogatory phrase to refer to Jiang’s practice of promoting people with whom he had
worked with in Shanghai to higher positions in Beijing. These people were seen by Jiang to be
more loyal than others and he promoted them to help him secure his hold on power (Lam, 1999;
Li, 2016). This group held on to influence in China throughout Hu Jintao’s time as helmsman
(2002-2012), preventing him from executing all of his initiatives especially early on when Jiang
was still holding onto positions. The Shanghai Clique was given a boost when Xi Jinping took
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office in 2012; Xi served as party secretary of Shanghai in 2007 and has long time ties with Jiang
Zemin. As the Core Leader, he has also worked to promote people he worked with in Shanghai
to top spots. Due to Xi’s relationship to Jiang, the Gang of Princelings and the Shanghai Clique
are said to have merged (Lam, 2006; Li, 2016).
The Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) has served as a recruitment pool for
Chinese leadership and has bases in Universities throughout the PRC (Li, 2001). Hu Jintao was
made the first Party Secretary of the CCYL party committee in 1984 and was a key patron to this
group during his time as the Core Leader. Hu’s CCYL Clique and Jiang’s Shanghai Clique were
in direct competition during the early years of Hu’s leadership. Xi’s leadership led to a decline in
the CCYL’s influence in the CCP, but the CCYL still serves as a recruiting pool for cadres and
the Premier Li Keqiang served as CCYL Secretariat from 1983-1998 and has strong ties to the
CCYL Clique (Lam, 2006; Li, 2016).
The top leadership role is one that has a large amount of restrictions, a divided leadership
and a lack of ability for the Core Leader to control lower ranking officials. In the current
structure the top official must look to garner support of the populace and lower level officials.
Due to consensus building in decision making in the PRC, individuals in government appear to
be diluted in their ability to influence policies. The use of collective leadership also keeps the
Core Leader from holding the same amount of power that was held by Mao and Deng
(Blanchard, 2015; Teiwes, 2001).
When elites generate too much public attention in the CCP they can be seen as potential
political rivals for those in the top spots. This makes them an easy target for political
maneuvering and to be overlooked when it is time for promotions. Additionally, those who show
competence and a lack of a large public profile will be considered for promotions over others.
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This limits those that captivate the public and rewards those who keep a lower profile causing
those in higher positions to be less politically dangerous to those in the top spots (Gueorguiev &
Schuler, 2016). This method of promotion shows how individuals make it to the top in Chinese
politics and how those individuals in the top positions can maneuver to limit the powers of those
that they see as a threat to their position and the party.
In this way those with the most influence will not be able to make it to the top positions
and only those who keep a low profile until they reach this spot will stand a chance for further
promotion. This limits how much power individuals can have in Chinese politics until they reach
the last leg of their careers. This would indicate that elites in Chinese politics have less influence
unless they are in the highest positions, pushing all the influence to the top of the leadership
chain. Those serving in lower levels would simply follow their factional alliances until they
make it to higher positions where they have more power and influence to those in lower positions
(Gueorguiev & Schuler, 2016).
Chinese politics takes place within the context of a consensus building system (Li, 2016).
Top leaders have more to gain by promoting those that are loyal over those who are competent.
This can serve as a general rule, but this is not always true. As long as those competent choices
show no signs of having too much individual support they can be more likely for promotion. The
consensus building model can create an environment which makes a trade between promoting
for loyalty and promoting for competency (Gueorguiev & Schuler, 2016; Li, 2001, 2016).
High profile individuals can easily disrupt power-sharing arrangements. In the CCP it is
vital that low level officials do not question the position of the party which would hurt the
party’s image of cohesion (Gueorguiev & Schuler, 2016). This gives more reason to keep these
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individuals out of higher positions and to promote those individuals with lower levels of public
recognition and with this logic who appear to be less of a threat to regime stability.
The top leader of an autocratic regime can influence the direction of the country’s
policies greatly. The regime has seen a shift in direction in foreign policy and this can be
attributed to Xi Jinping’s ascension to the top spot. In authoritarian regimes policy shifts are
most common when a new leader takes office. China’s increased assertiveness has been
attributed to Xi’s attitude toward foreign policy goals (Liao, 2016).
The Core Leaders’ Rise Through the CCP
Mao Zedong
Mao Zedong was a member of the CCP since its creation in July of 1921, although he
was not a high ranking leader during this time period. Mao was involved in early CCP struggles
and after the Long March period Mao began writing essays on what he believed the CCP should
represent. Mao believed that the CCP should have a rural emphasis rather than the urban focus
that was more commonly associated with Marxist revolutions. Mao was finally able to oust his
competition in the early 1940s, serving as the first, and only, Chairman of the Central Politburo
of the CCP and the first Chairman of the CCCCP (Cheek, 2010; Karl, 2010). On October 1, 1949
Mao stood on the edge of the Forbidden City in Beijing and announced the creation of the PRC
stating “the Chinese people have stood up!” (Cheek, 2010, pg. 10).
The Great Leap Forward (1958-1962), a major political campaign under Mao, was an
attempt to turn the mostly agrarian economy of the PRC into an industrially advanced one
(Cheek, 2010; Karl, 2010). Mao instructed Chinese people to create iron furnaces in their
backyards to increase the nation’s steel production. The shift of production from grain to steel
created a deficit in the production of food and resulted in a massive famine causing the deaths of
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80 to 100 million people. Although this generated the amount of production in steel that Mao had
hoped, the policy was abandoned earlier than the five year period intended and Mao retreated to
the second front of leadership making others fix the issues caused by this policy (Cheek, 2010;
Karl, 2010).
Mao launched the so-called “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” in August of 1966 in
an attempt to shake up the leadership of the CCP and to solidify his return to the forefront of
Chinese politics. This led to the creation of the Red Guard movement, a student group that was
used to persecute political rivals and attack citizens who were seen in opposition to Chairman
Mao. Mao stated that the Cultural Revolution ended in 1969, but, more accurately, it lasted until
Mao’s death and the arrest of the group of powerful elites, including Mao’s fourth wife, Jiang
Qing, who controlled PRC policy during Mao’s final years. Jiang Qing and three others
divisively known as the “Gang of Four” were subjected to a show trial in 1980, and bore the guilt
of the Cultural Revolution after Mao’s death in September of 1976 (Cheek, 2010; Karl, 2010).
Deng Xiaoping
Deng Xiaoping started as a revolutionary figure in the war against the KMT. After the
establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Deng served as mayor of
Chongqing while continuing the fight against the nationalist party in southwestern China. He
later went to Beijing to serve as the Vice-premier of the committee on Finance. Deng supported
many of Mao Zedong’s movements, such as his Anti-Rightist Movement (1957), and eventually
became the Secretary General of the Secretariat (China’s body) putting him just under some of
the highest ranking members of the CCP at the time. Deng survived several campaigns against
him including finding himself on the opposite side of the Red Guards during the Cultural
Revolution resulting in the arrest of his family (Lampton, 2014; Marti, 2002; Vogel, 2011).
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In April of 1976, Deng Xiaoping was exiled from the CCP by Mao Zedong, for the
second time. This was due to unrest in Beijing, brought on by the death of former premier Zhou
Enlai. During this period of time Deng was working outside of the government to gain support
among the lower level cadres for a possible return to power. After Mao’s death and the arrest of
the Gang of Four, Deng was brought back into political favor. In Dec, 1978 in the Third Plenum
of the 10th Party Congress, Deng was reinstated to his former offices and titles: Vice-Chairman
of the CCCCP, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), chief of the general
staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Vice-Premier of the State Council, and member of
the CCCCP and the Politburo Standing Committee (late 1976-1977) (Lampton, 2014; Marti,
2002; Vogel, 2011).
During this time, Hua Guofeng was the official successor to Mao Zedong, but by 1978
Deng was able to maneuver around him. Deng did not completely destroy his political opponent,
but instead allowed him to resign and leave the post without humiliation. This was a central tenet
of Deng’s leadership, standing in stark contrast to the style of Mao Zedong. Even before this
event, Deng had shown himself to be a strong leader of the CCP, but after Hua was removed
Deng showed himself as a strong statesman (Lampton, 2014; Marti, 2002; Vogel, 2011).
Deng inherited an extremely poor China as a result of Mao’s policies. Deng took office
with high infant mortality rates and a GDP that was smaller than previous years. Due to this,
economic development and expansion became the top priorities of his leadership. He also
worked to create structures for power sharing and systems for passing the leadership to new
generations (Lampton, 2014; Marti, 2002; Vogel, 2011).
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Jiang Zemin
Jiang Zemin faced a rocky start in the CCP, first joining the Party in the early 1940s
during his time at Nanjing University. He was a party boss for several factories early on in his
career, and during the Anti-Rightist Campaign he showed distaste for Mao’s policies. He was
ordered to oust employees for being rightist, but Jiang showed reluctance to do so, and this
resulted in his family members facing persecution. Jiang was suspended from the party during
the Cultural Revolution and was seen as too much of an “expert” and not supportive of Chairman
Mao’s policies (Gilley, 1998).
Jiang returned to prominence in the 1970s when he was promoted to a position in the
Foreign Affairs Bureau by then Premier Zhou Enlai. He served in this position until Mao’s death;
after the arrest of the Gang of Four (1976) Jiang was sent to Shanghai to restore the city to
economic prominence. He worked in this position for less than a year before he became a viceminister of the foreign trade and investment commission and worked to set-up Special Economic
Zones (SEZ) around the region. This project had great success and helped Jiang secure further
advancement. In 1982, Jiang was made Vice-minister of Electronics Industry and he was made
Deputy Party Secretary in the CCCCP (Gilley, 1998).
Jiang became Mayor of Shanghai in 1985; this position would serve as his most
important for his rise to the top. As mayor of Shanghai, China’s largest city, Jiang worked to
improve the economy of the provincial level city. He set goals to repair the city’s infrastructure
and increase the city’s standard of living. While serving in this role, Jiang made valuable
connections that he would use as the Core Leader to help him secure his position (Gilley, 1998).
After the violent suppression of the student movement at Tiananmen Square on June 4,
1989, CCP leaders called for reform and Deng’s original successors were abandoned. Due to his
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perceived fair handling of student protests in Shanghai as well as the lack of violence associated
with this protest, Jiang Zemin was promoted as a compromise successor and was elevated to the
position of CCP General Secretary in 1989, Chairman of the CMC in 1990 and President of the
PRC in 1993. During the beginning of Jiang Zemin’s time as general secretary of the CCP, he
was generally seen as a transitional leader with Deng Xiaoping still dictating much of the Party’s
policies and directions even if largely from behind the scenes. It wasn’t until after Deng’s death
in 1993 that Jiang was able to fully lead the PRC, his most prominent contribution being his idea
of the “Three Represents” highlighting economic output, cultural development and political
consensus (Gilley, 1998).
Hu Jintao
Hu Jintao attended Qinghua University in Beijing where he studied hydraulic
engineering. After graduating, the Ministry of Hydraulic engineering sent him to the
economically poor Gansu province, where he served in a variety of roles including engineer and
secretary. During the fourteen years that he was in Gansu (1973-1980) he was able to display
himself as both “red” and “expert” or that he was loyal and well educated. Hu became a
bureaucrat at the Construction Commission in 1973, eventually becoming vice-chief. Hu was
later made head of the Gansu provincial CCYL in 1982. Later in 1984, Hu returned to Beijing as
secretary of the national CCYL party committee. Hu was then sent to another economically poor
province, Guizhou. In his new position, Hu set himself up as an empathetic party boss who is
willing to talk to the people (Lam, 2006).
Hu’s most prominent position was when he was transferred to Tibet in 1988 even though
he is believed to have spent very little time in the province due to his altitude sickness. This new
position was not seen as a promotion, but as a way to punish him when his patron Hu Yaobang

32

was purged shortly beforehand as a result of student demonstrations in 1986. Tibet during this
time was experiencing large scale social unrest and uprisings reached the capital city, Lhasa, in
1989. Hu never gave a direct order for police forces to suppress the protests, but when protesters
started to riot, police forces acted without authorization from Hu. Had the police’s actions
resulted in more unrest, Hu would have had deniability, but because they were successful Hu
was able to take credit for the restoration of peace. He was made a member of the Politburo
Standing Committee (PSC) in 1992 as a direct result of his work in Tibet. When Hu was elevated
to the PSC he was also put in line to succeed Jiang as the core of the fourth generation (Lam,
2006).
At the sixteenth National Party Congress in 2002, Hu Jintao was elevated to General
Secretary of the CCP and President of the PRC. Jiang held onto the Chairmanship of the CMC
for another year. It wasn’t until the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in
2003 that Jiang lost prominence and moved to the sidelines. When the SARS epidemic broke
out, Jiang’s response was to ignore it, allowing the epidemic to worsen, for which he was heavily
criticized. During this crisis, Hu Jintao set out to prevent the spread of the disease and remove
the corrupt officials whose policies failed to tame the spread of the disease. The resulting purges
helped Hu remove Jiang-aligned officials from the party and to establish himself as a strong
leader for the CCP. Jiang stepped down as Chair of the CMC soon after this crisis, setting up Hu
as the Core Leader (Lam, 2006).
Xi Jinping
Xi Jinping made his professional start in 1968 in the countryside of Shaanxi province in
the village of Liangjiahe where he lived in a cave and worked with the illiterate peasants. In this
city he joined the CCYL and it wasn’t until 1974 that he was allowed to join the CCP due to his
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father’s disgrace as a party member under Mao Zedong. After Xi was permitted to join the CCP
he became the party secretary for Liangjiahe village. From 1975-1979, Xi attended Qinghua
University and obtained a degree in chemical engineering. After graduating, Xi joined the CMC
as a personal secretary to a defense minister (Lam, 2015; Li, 2016).
In 1985, Xi returned to the countryside near Beijing as deputy Party Secretary of
Zhengding County. In this position, Xi was able to show himself as a man of the masses. He
stayed in this role until leaving in 2002 to become Party Secretary of Zhejiang. As Party
Secretary, Xi put forward policies to increase the economic output of the region and also
instituted liberal policies for the promotion of village administrators. Xi went on to serve in
Shanghai for just a few months before being promoted to the PSC in 2007. During his time in
Shanghai, Xi formed a relationship with Jiang Zemin that was integral to his eventual promotion
to CCP General Secretary in November of 2012. In March of 2013, Xi was made the President of
the PRC and Chairman of the CMC (Lam, 2015; Li, 2016).
Hu Jintao’s transfer to Xi Jinping was the first full transfer of all three offices. This
transition indicates that the norm of term limits to the Core Leader was completely in use. This
transition did not come about naturally and was a result of Xi virtually disappearing from the
public eye for two weeks preceding the transfer of power (Li, 2016). Originally, Hu intended to
retain the Chairmanship of the CMC much like Jiang did in 2002. This event is said to have
caused Xi’s silent protest resulting in Hu giving up the CMC Chairmanship in exchange for
being able to promote several Hu-loyal members (Lam, 2015; Li, 2016).
Xi Jinping’s career shows a strong understanding of the need to keep a low profile until
the time was right, especially during periods of conflict like the student protests in 1989. Xi had
a relatively small public profile until he was elevated to top spots when he could freely show his
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charisma. He had to keep his public profile light until he was clear from threats. This is further
illustrated in the fact that Xi’s wife was much more famous prior to 2012 (Lam, 2015;
Gueorguiev & Schuler, 2016). This would indicate that to get to the highest levels of Chinese
government you have to be able to discern what actions will cause too much attention and avoid
creating too high of a public profile, all while making just large enough of a splash to be
promotable. This makes individuals in leadership positions in the CCP fairly ineffective in lower
levels and adds more weight to the factional model of Chinese politics. Xi has been seen as an
expert at social media. He has shown a strong ability to display himself in multiple different
lights and roles through the use of the media which has helped him create a favorable image with
the general population (Jeffreys, 2016; Lam, 2015).
The level of influence an individual leader has in Chinese politics is also dependent on
the issue of study. When considering broad initiatives of the CCP then each individual may show
lower levels of influence. But, most officials will have the ability to directly influence local
policies or will show more ability to influence the policy of their subordinates (Jie, 1999). This
shows that depending on what is being studied an individual can show more or less influence
with the top official being able to enact more influence on the policies of the country as a whole.
Characteristics of the CCP’s Leadership
At the founding of the CCP in 1921 through the early days of the PRC, membership in
the government was based on the services provided and the deeds completed in the revolution.
The best way to gain advancement was to show unwavering loyalty to the current leaders. This
over reliance on loyalty was due in part to the struggles the communists faced to gain power.
Mao believed that it was better to be “red than expert,” in that he believed that loyalty to the
party was more important than being well educated. In fact, most of the early requirements for
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promotion were based on length of membership, being committed to Marxism and Mao, loyalty,
and finally being from a proletarian background. These requirements made it better for
advancement to be from a lower class status and due to this they were often less educated than
the elite of today (Karl, 2010; Li, 2001).
During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the Red Guards were used
against intellectuals with intellectuals being seen as against Mao and the communist government.
In 1955, less than five percent of leaders had a high school education or higher, showing how
much more other experiences were rated than education in the eyes of Mao (Karl, 2010). In fact,
intellectual thought was seen as dangerous to the stability of Mao’s regime. Due to this, many
peasant and working class citizens were brought into Mao’s government. The promotion for
loyalty to the party and Maoist ideology led to a ruling class that was overwhelmingly
undereducated and loyal to the status quo, giving Mao an unlimited amount of power and
influence over the policy of the country. This promotion style was very beneficial to Mao,
creating an environment where he could easily get the results that he wanted (Cheek, 2010; Karl,
2010; Li, 2001, 2016).
Once Deng Xiaoping took control, in late 1978, he started a shift towards promoting
those with a technical background and began the era of the technocrat in Chinese politics (Li,
2016). The technocrats were central in Deng’s efforts to modernize China and Deng made
having a college degree important for serving in government positions. This led to a country
whose leadership mostly holds degrees in engineering. For example, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao
were trained as engineers (Li, 2001).
Deng Xiaoping promoted leaders who were young, well-educated, had specialized
training and had a history of political service without any signs of being overly radical. This was
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all a part of Deng’s plan to make smarter younger elite in the PRC which would work to protect
China’s place in the world and promote confidence and regime stability (Li, 2001). This move
also forced out the older generation which still had ties to the Maoist ideals and revolutionary
ideology which Deng saw as a threat to the stability of the country.
This move away from those with military experience to promoting those with degrees in
technical professions also highlights the shift the country has taken. From Mao’s policies which
were militaristic and nationalistic to Deng’s policy of opening-up the PRC to the current political
environment. The changes in leadership background parallel these shifts. This shift toward those
with higher levels of education in leadership roles is also not a brand-new idea in China and
mirrors the meritocracy practices that existed under the Confucian system (Li, 2001).
During Deng Xiaoping’s time at the helm of the CCP he relied on the military leaders to
stay in power after the protests of 1989. In fact, without this group it is unlikely that Deng would
have been able to retain his hold on the government. Deng used strong-arm tactics to make a
system that would remain stable in the changing conditions of the world and his connections to
the very group he was trying to remove from the government made these changes possible (Li,
2001).
Since 1982, each Central Committee that has been held has had over fifty percent new
members (Li, 2016). This number consists of those who retired and those who moved to higher
positions. This turnover rate was a norm that Deng Xiaoping put into place when he was
attempting to create a government of younger leaders (Li, 2016).
In addition to Deng’s norms restricting how many terms a leader can serve in one
position he also instituted restrictions mandating a level of advanced education (Li, 2001). In the
period of 1980-1986, just after this restriction was implemented, over a million senior cadres
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retired (Li, 2016). These members were all disqualified from continuing in the government due
to Deng’s retirement norms and education requirements (Cho, 2008; Li, 2001).
Not only did these norms help Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin secure power, they also
helped change the political landscape of the country. By creating an elite class that was younger
and better educated, they were better suited for the continued modernization of the country.
Additionally, these changes created more leadership turnover which is beneficial for the stability
of authoritarian regimes (Li, 2001, 2016; Ma, 2016).
Retirement norms contributed greatly to the rise of the technocrats in the 1980s, with
older members retiring and then being replaced by better educated elites. The trend towards
having a government of technocrats hit a peak in the 15th Party Congress (1997-2002) and has
since been in decline. Current members of the 18th Party Congress (2012-2017) hold degrees in
economics, law and political science (Li, 2016). These members hold more advanced degrees
than the government ever has before. Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping all held advanced
degrees in engineering as the top leader in the CCP. These technocratic leaders have generally
been engineers in name only and they have rarely worked as engineers in any capacity (Li, 2001,
2016).
The CCP Party Congress is the “highest decision-making body” of the CCP and is the
institution that establishes the party platform and direction for the upcoming years (Wu, 2015,
pg. 2). The CCP Party Congress is a group of members that meets once every five years to
establish what the focus of the party will be and any changes to party leadership. In the 18th
Party Congress of 2012, Xi Jinping was made the General Secretary (Wu, 2015).
The persuasiveness of technocrats in Chinese politics can be said to influence the policy
orientation of the country. Due to their similar training these technocrats think in specific ways.
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Their similar technical training is not common in the general population creating an elite
environment in the CCP. This is similar to the previous generations of Chinese politics who
shared revolutionary backgrounds (Li, 2001)
Even with the shift towards promoting for education and ability, nepotism and patronclient relations are still a big part of politics in the PRC. The term limits and age restrictions have
decreased the benefits of this relationship, but it is still an issue in the political climate of the
country. Elites in China have often used their links to others in higher positions for personal
gains, as indicated in the advancement of the Qinghua Clique and the CCYL. Members of these
groups were given special positions because of who they knew and this in turn showed who they
would be loyal to. These ties continue even in a time when technical background and experience
are seen as more important than family ties or class background (Li, 2001).
Conclusions
Each of the generations of CCP leaders has utilized their positions in different ways. Mao
came to power during a civil war against the Kuomintang (KMT). Mao’s struggles during the
time period before the Communist claim of victory in 1949 was one marked with various
victories and near defeat. His experiences during these times show through in his iron grasp of
power during his time at the helm of the CCP (Karl, 2010).
Deng Xiaoping carries a similar history. Being a revolutionary leader, and so-called
“immortal,” his time under Mao was marked with two excommunications from the CCP,
including a widespread campaign to “Criticize Deng” throughout China. He came back into
power just before Mao’s death and was able to maneuver around the “Gang of Four” and
eventually take control. His tenure reflects these struggles as well, he worked to open China to
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the rest of the world and create norms to make the transfer of leadership more seamless and
create less disruption for the party (Lampton, 2014; Li, 2001).
Mao’s period as Chairman was one of struggle and strife between members of the CCP.
Deng knew this firsthand, being stripped of his titles on several occasions. Deng had to
maneuver to protect the party from being in a constant state of struggle. He created institutional
norms on the leaders of the PRC to create an environment that supported cooperation over
competition, saying that the PRC’s stability relied on a collective leadership style (Lampton,
2014; Li, 2016; Teiwes, 2001).
Deng began the transition of power to the next generation by passing leadership positions
over to Jiang Zemin, and, for the first time, a term limit of two five year periods. This transition
was not fast and Deng held on to power long after he gave up the titles he held finally retiring
from the CMC in 1989 and moving out of the public eye in late 1992. Jiang was neither the first
nor second choice for Deng’s successor further illustrating the contentious nature of Chinese
elite politics. In the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, the early front runners, Hu
Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, were set aside and a compromise was made which elevated Jiang to
the top spot. Jiang’s ascension showed the power of the consensus method that was building in
the CCP and the tenuous grasp Jiang had on power of the country. Due to his rough and
unforeseen start, Jiang maneuvered to hold control for as long as possible and worked to create
an environment where he would be able to influence the direction of the country even after he
ceded power to Hu Jintao (Tien & Chu, 2000).
Hu Jintao was the first Core Leader to achieve power supported by the institutional norms
set forth by Deng, although Jiang Zemin held on to the CMC Chairmanship for a year after his
term was over. Hu’s leadership was the first to not be led by revolutionary leaders and was the
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rise of the educated ruling elite, with most of this generation beginning their careers during the
Cultural Revolution (Li, 2001). His Core Leadership was one that was heavily influenced by
institutional norms and he was seen as a fairly ineffective leader (Lam, 2006; Lampton 2014).
Hu handed over the reins of all three Chairmanships to Xi Jinping, making this the first
complete transfer of power to the next generation. This movement furthered the power of the
norms set forth by Deng Xiaoping. But, Xi’s leadership has shown more powerful than the
previous two moving away from the consensus building method that has been known in the PRC
under the previous two leaders to more power in the top spot (Lam, 2006; Li, 2016).
Xi created additional institutions to give himself more control over the workings of the
PRC, chairing 12 committees within the first four years of his term. Xi’s leadership includes
General secretary of the CCCCP, President of the PRC, Chairman of the CMC of the CCP,
Chairman of the CMC of the PRC, Chairman of the National Security Committee, Head of the
Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, Head of the Central Leading
Group for Foreign Affairs, Head of the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs, Head of the
Central Leading Group for Financial and Economic Work, Head of the Central Leading Group
for Network Security and Information Technology, Head of the CMC Leading Group for
Deepening Reforms of National Defense and the Military, and Commander in Chief of the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Joint Operations Command Center. Xi’s creation of Central
Leading Group for the Comprehensive Deepening of Reforms have greatly expanded his control
through subgroups in charge of important policy areas including one that takes control of the
economy, which is normally a primary duty of the vice premier. This new seat consolidates more
power into the Core Leader position giving Xi more breadth of control of the policies of the CCP
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leading some to refer to Xi as the “Chairman of everything” (Miller, 2014, 2016; Lam, 2015;
Callick, 2016; Li, 2016).
The CCP has existed for just under one hundred years, and in that timeframe it has seen
mixed periods of development and institutionalization. Each generation of leadership has
inherited different political environments and each Core Leader has been able to express varying
degrees of control over the CCP. Additionally, each leader has shown different approaches to
their leadership. Does Xi show signs of having the same style of leadership to that of Mao’s?
Their speeches might hold the key to this comparison and this will be explored in the following
chapter.
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Ch. 3: Leadership Trait Analysis
Introduction
Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) is a method created by Margaret Hermann, allowing
researchers to gain valuable information on leaders that would otherwise be difficult to obtain,
such as leaders in authoritarian countries or who are deceased where speeches might still be
accessible. Through a content analysis of a leader’s speeches, researchers can find information
about how a leader sees the world, and gain insight into a leader’s motivation for obtaining office
and power. For the research presented in this chapter, 167 speeches by Mao Zedong and 79
speeches by Xi Jinping were inputted into a content analysis program called Profiler+ (Gorener
& Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
Profiler+ is a program that processes the content of a speech, looking for word
frequencies and how certain words are used. In testing this program has shown 100 percent intercoder reliability when processing speeches for these variables. There are seven variables that are
coded for in this process: Distrust in others (DIS), the focus on problem solving over relationship
building (TASK), belief in ability to control events (BACE), in-group bias (IGB), selfconfidence (SC), conceptual complexity (CC), and need for power (PWR). For each of these
variables, the leader is given a score from the analysis of their speeches. That score is then
compared to a group of 121 political leaders which serves as a norming group for this analysis.
The norming group is used to determine if they are high, low, or average on each trait based off
of the mean of the norming group, one standard deviation above the mean is a high score in each
trait and one standard deviation below the mean is a low score in each trait (Hermann, 2003). A
fuller discussion on this process and how each variable is coded can be found in Chapter One.
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Using this method to analyze Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping, care was taken to find
accurate translations of the texts of their speeches. This study analyzes the official collections
and translations of Mao and Xi’s speeches from the Foreign Language Press. The Mao collection
contained 167 speeches, and Xi’s collection contained 79 speeches.
The speeches analyzed were on a variety of topics. Each collection included speeches
from both leaders on foreign policy, domestic policy, economic initiatives, as well as speeches
on the general direction of the country. Mao and Xi spoke on similar topics, albeit within
significantly different contexts. The leaders also delivered speeches about their personal
ideological views on communism and Chinese ideals.
The speeches were analyzed in meaningful groups to test whether or not the leader’s
profile remained consistent across time. The Mao collection contains speeches from the
foundation of the CCP (1921) up until 1971, just five years before Mao’s death in 1976. Mao’s
speeches were broken up into sections based on historical events. The first section is from the
founding of the CCP (1921) to the founding of the PRC (1949) with 125,423 words. The second
section was the first period of the PRC, 1949 until the beginning of the Great Leap Forward
(1958), with 161,669 words. The next section contains the Great Leap Forward period until right
before the Cultural Revolution, from 1958 until 1965, which contains 101,832 words. The final
segment contains the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which started in 1966 and continued
until the end of Mao’s life in 1976, containing 88,529 words. The last speech was dated in 1971.
The total words analyzed for Mao is 477,453 words. Mao’s results can be found in Table 3.1.
The collection of Xi speeches is across a three year period (2012-2014). Xi’s total words for all
three years are 117,855: 12,390 in 2012, 71,619 in 2013 and 33,846 words in 2014. Xi’s results
can be found in Table 3.2.
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A statistical analysis of Mao and Xi’s scores across time (Tables 3.3 and 3.4) demonstrate
that both leaders’ scores in each category are consistent across time. This indicates that across
the period of each leader’s time as a core of the PRC their style of leadership has remained
constant. Mao’s scores were consistent throughout the many changes that occurred over his thirty
years at the helm of the PRC and Xi’s scores remained consistent throughout the three years
considered in this analysis.

45

Table 3.1 Mao Zedong LTA results (1922-1971)
Leader’s Scores

LTA characteristics

Political leaders
N= 121

DIS

.32

Mid

L<.20

M=.38

H>.53

TASK

.69

Mid

L<.48

M=.62

H>.76

BACE

.37

Mid

L<.33

M=.45

H>.57

IGB

.13

Low

L<.34

M=.43

H>.53

SC

.40

Mid

L<.34

M=.57

H>.80

CC

.58

High

L<.32

M=.45

H>.58

PWR

.29

Low

L<.38

M=.50

H>.62

Table 3.2 Xi Jinping LTA results (2012-2014)
Leader’s Scores

LTA characteristics

Political leaders
N= 121

DIS

.08

Low

L<.20

M=.38

H>.53

TASK

.69

Mid

L<.48

M=.62

H>.76

BACE

.32

Low

L<.33

M=.45

H>.57

IGB

.20

Low

L<.34

M=.43

H>.53

SC

.31

Low

L<.34

M=.57

H>.80

CC

.46

Mid

L<.32

M=.45

H>.58

PWR

.34

Low

L<.38

M=.50

H>.62
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Table 3.3 The effect of time on Mao’s leadership traits
Time

DIS

TASK

BACE

IGB

SC

CC

PWR

Pre 1949

.35

.71

.38

.15

.39

.53

.30

1949-1958

.34

.69

.39

.13

.54

.57

.32

1958-1965

.26

.67

.36

.12

.35

.60

.25

1966-1976

.29

.65

.36

.12

.34

.57

.27

Note:∗ denotes that there is a statistically significant difference at the 0.05 significance level.

Table 3.4 The effect of time on Xi’s leadership traits
Time

DIS

TASK

BACE

IGB

SC

CC

PWR

2012

.03

.85

.31

.21

.4

.27

.35

2013

.03

.85

.31

.21

.4

.27

.35

2014

.12

.59

.32

.23

.31

.48

.33

Note: denotes that there is a statistically significant difference at the 0.05 significance level.
∗
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Leadership Profiles
The analysis of each leader is broken into four sections: does the leader respect or
challenge constraints, is the leader open or closed to contextual information, and is the leader
motivated by problems or relationships. Each section will give insight into an aspect of the
leaders’ styles and will allow for comparisons to be made between the two leaders.
Does the leader respect or challenge constraints?
Whether a leader respects or challenges constraints is answered with how a leader scores
in his or her belief in the leader’s ability to control events (BACE) and need for power (PWR).
These variables give insight into how a leader views the world and how much they are motivated
by obtaining and holding power (Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston,
Korany & Shaw, 2001). Mao scored Mid on BACE and low on PWR, as seen in Table 3.1. Xi
scored low on BACE and PWR, as seen in Table 3.2.
Table 3.5 BACE and PWR
Leader

Belief in Ability to Control Events

Need for Power

Mao Zedong

Mid

Low

Xi Jinping

Low

Low

BACE is a variable that indicates how a leader will view the world around them. It
indicates whether leaders will see the world as a place that can be shaped how they want or if
they will see it as something they have little control over (Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann,
2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001). As Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show, both Mao and Xi
are in the low to mid range of scores for BACE. Leaders who are low or mid in BACE tend to be
more reactive in situations; they tend to see how a situation is going to turn out before acting.
These leaders are less likely to take initiatives and more likely to let others take responsibility for
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initiatives that are outside of the norm or outside of the leader’s comfort area. These leaders are
more likely to delegate authority in the hopes that others will be able to have more success than
they themselves would have. If an initiative fails the leader is also more likely to pass the
responsibility onto someone else. Leaders with low to mid BACE scores will only want to take
the lead on initiatives that they feel have higher chances of success. They are unlikely to
shoulder the responsibility for failures and are quick to blame others for getting in the way of
their success. They are more likely to be worried about the fear of failure than to worry about the
necessary timing of actions (Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany
& Shaw, 2001).
The PWR variable displays how much a leader wants to control or impact other people or
groups. This variable is focused on the amount a leader will work to maintain, restore or
establish power over other people or in new areas (Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003;
Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001). Mao and Xi both scored low on PWR. When a leader
scores low on PWR, he or she does not emphasize the need to take charge and can be in a
position where they are one among many who share power. Empowering others is important for
those who score low in PWR and they are also more likely to allow others to receive credit for
the work they do. These leaders empower their followers and build high morale and team spirit
in them. They work to build trust with their followers and make a sense of shared responsibility.
Leaders with low PWR scores are likely to have a high sense of justice and will deal with people
evenly, based on the norms of the group. They do not play favorites and will be very clear about
what will happen if someone violates the norms of the group. These individuals become the
representative of the group’s desires in policy making decisions (Gorener & Ucal, 2011;
Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
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Leaders who score low on both BACE and PWR are more likely to respect constraints in
their environments and will work to build consensus with other leaders when working through
issues. Mao and Xi’s scores for these traits would indicate that they believe reaching
compromise is an important skill to develop (Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann,
Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001). Leaders with similar scores on these variables are seen as likely
to respect constraints. They will work within the parameters that exist to move toward a chosen
goal. These leaders seek compromise and work to build consensus with these things being
regarded as important throughout their administration (Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003;
Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
Is the leader open or closed to contextual information?
A leader’s openness to information is dependent on his or her self-other orientation. The
self-other orientation will determine how often a leader will look to the others in the decision
group for input into issues they face. A leader’s openness to information is dependent on his or
her scores in Self Confidence (SC) and Conceptual Complexity (CC). For this measure, leaders
will either have a SC that is greater than their CC, a CC that is greater than their SC or be equal
in these scores (Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw,
2001).
SC measures how much a person rates their own self importance, their image, or their
own abilities. SC will affect how much a leader’s opinion is likely to change when presented
with new information. A person’s sense of self will control for stimuli from the environment and
a leader’s self-confidence will affect how a leader will view themselves in different contexts
(Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
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Mao scored towards the middle for scores of SC, seen in Table 3.1. Leaders who score in
the middle of scores for SC will fluctuate between listening to others for information in some
contexts and ignoring input from others on certain projects that they feel strongly on. Leaders in
this range will seek out information on some issues and little or no information on other issues
(Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
Xi scored low in SC, seen in Table 3.2. Leaders who are low in SC will constantly be
seeking out information in their environment to influence what their next action will be in their
current situations. Input from others is a critical part of the decision making process for leaders
who are low on SC. These leaders are likely to be seen as inconsistent, serving as an agent to
whatever group is most vocal in the current situation over their own interests (Gorener & Ucal,
2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
CC shows how much information a leader seeks out before making a decision. CC is a
measure of how much a leader differentiates between different ideas and the level of thought a
leader puts into a decision. This measure shows how a leader will be at considering different
sides and positions of an issue. CC measures how much ambiguity a leader will see in the world
and the situation they are working on and the level of flexibility they will have in the decision
making process (Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw,
2001).
Mao scored in the high range of scores for CC. Leaders who are high in CC believe that
an issue has many parts that need to be fully understood before a decision can be reached. These
leaders believe that there is always room for another perspective on an issue. They are less likely
to trust their own first reaction to an event and will prefer to seek out the opinions of others on it
before making a decision. Leaders who are high on CC are likely to take longer to make a
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decision on what action to take (Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston,
Korany & Shaw, 2001).
Xi scored toward the middle in CC. Leaders who score in the middle for CC can fluctuate
between decision making methods when making decisions on different topics. On some topics
the leader can be more open to the perspectives of others and on other topics the leader may be
more likely to use their personal biases and stereotypes to make quick decisions. In certain
situations this leader will be more likely to act on instinct alone without seeking out other
opinions or information. They are also more likely to view the world as highly structured making
it easier to see what decision should be made (Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann,
Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
Table 3.6 SC and CC
Leader

Self Confidence

Conceptual Complexity

Mao Zedong

Mid

High

Xi Jinping

Low

Mid

Mao had a CC score that is greater than his SC score, Xi also scored higher on CC than
SC. Leaders who score higher on conceptual complexity than self confidence are open to
contextual information. These leaders are normally more pragmatic, and responsive to the
interests and needs of others. Leaders in this range are sensitive to the situation and act in ways
that they feel is acceptable depending on the information that they have. They deal with
problems and events on a case by case basis and are more likely to organize collegial decision
structures to increase the amount of information that they can accumulate (Gorener & Ucal,
2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
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Is the leader motivated by problems or relationships?
The motivation of a leader is expressed with three of the variables in LTA. Through Task
focus (TASK), in-group bias (IGB), and Distrust of others (DIS), insight can be made into what
motivates a political leader. These variables map out why a leader sought office by determining
what a leader’s focus is. Additionally, these variables determine how a leader views the groups
that they identify with and how they view those that they identify as members of the out group.
These variables will indicate what a leader will be willing to do to protect groups they identify
with (Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
Leaders have certain roles that they fill when making decisions. They either push to
complete specific tasks or they work to build relationships and improve morale. All leaders will
fall somewhere on the continuum of being task driven or relationship driven. One end of the
continuum will be completely focused on the task at hand the other is completely focused on the
feelings of constituents and followers (Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann,
Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
Mao and Xi both scored in the moderate range of scores for TASK, these results are
displayed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. Moderate scores in TASK can have various
motivations depending on the situation, in some contexts they are motivated by solving particular
problems and in others they are motivated by building relationships. These leaders scored on the
high end of the moderate level of scores indicating that these leaders lean toward a focus on
solving problems on a majority of situations but, this can vary depending on the situation
(Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001). Mao and
Xi fall in the middle of the scores for this variable, so it is likely that they will seek to motivate
followers as well as strongly push for results. For this model, Mao and Xi are likely to switch
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motivations depending on the situation. Leaders in the moderate range of scores for TASK are
seen as charismatic leaders and will investigate whether the situation calls for solving problems
or building relationships. They will use whichever motivation is appropriate for that situation,
especially when they will gain more from a certain motivation over the other (Gorener & Ucal,
2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
When leaders are focused on solving problems they are more likely to sacrifice morale in
exchange for results. In these situations leaders believes that it is impossible to solve the issue
and make everyone happy. These leaders are constantly pushing their followers to achieve the
desired results without worrying about the effect on morale (Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann,
2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
When focusing on building relationships, leaders who are moderate on TASK are more
likely to seek loyalty and commitment from their followers to complete a goal. They will be
more sensitive to what those involved want and strive to achieve goals that make everyone
involved satisfied. When focused on building relationships these leaders believe that motivating
and empowering followers is the main task of leadership and completing the desired task is
secondary (Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
In-group bias (IGB) and Distrust for others (DIS) help to display if a leader is motivated
by the perceived threats they see in the world or by seeking out opportunities to build
relationships. These variables indicate how confrontational a leader will be when dealing with
other nations and groups. IGB and DIS will show how much a leader is likely to be aggressive in
protecting their own group or to work to make win-win solutions to problems. When a leader
lands on the aggressive side of the scale he or she will be more likely to get into conflicts with
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their neighbors, hoard resources, or be reclusive from the international environment (Gorener &
Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
IGB is the belief that one’s own group is the best group to be in and other groups are seen
as inferior. A person who has a high IGB will have a strong desire to protect his or her group’s
culture and history. DIS is a likelihood to be weary or others, those with high DIS scores tend to
worry about the motives of the actions of others more than those who are low in this variable
(Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show that Mao and Xi both scored low on IGB. Leaders who are low
on IGB are less likely to see the world in black and white terms they are interested in
maintaining the security of their group but, are less likely to categorize people in us or them
terms. Instead, these leaders will understand that us and them categories are fluid and change in
the individual contexts of the situations that they face. These leaders are also less likely to use
scapegoats to deal with domestic discontent (Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann,
Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
Mao scored in the moderate range on DIS, seen in Table 3.1. Leaders with higher DIS
scores are more likely to be suspicious of the actions of others. These leaders will see the actions
of others as in competition to their leadership or their goals. These leaders are highly concerned
with the loyalty of those around them and loyalty becomes an important prerequisite for working
with them. These leaders are often circulating advisors so they do not gain too much power to be
able to challenge their leadership. Mao’s scores are in the moderate range so the level of distrust
he feels will depend on the situation and can fluctuate when dealing with different contexts
(Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
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Table 3.2 shows that Xi falls into the group of leaders who are low on DIS who
frequently put actions into perspective. These leaders are likely to view past experience with
those involved and apply it to the current situation they face. Leaders in this group are more
likely to distrust others when there is a legitimate reason for it and not in a general sense. They
are not quick to be suspicious of those around them and rarely see others as a threat unless there
is a realistic reason for it (Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany &
Shaw, 2001).
Table 3.7 TASK, IGB, and DIS
Leader

Task focus

In Group Bias

Distrust of others

Mao Zedong

Mid

Low

Mid

Xi Jinping

Mid

Low

Low

Mao scored low on IGB and scored in the middle on DIS, leaders who share similar
scores are focused on taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships. These leaders
remain vigilant in these interactions and to changes in the international environment. Individuals
with similar scores see the world as conflict-prone but, they see other countries as being
constrained. For these leaders, flexibility in response is possible in different situations. A leader
who falls in this category will be likely to keep a close watch on the international environment
while preparing to contain their adversaries’ actions while trying to push for their country’s goals
(Gorener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
Xi scored low on both IGB and DIS, leaders with similar scores tend to take advantage of
opportunities and their relationships with others. These individuals see the world as a nonthreatening place and conflicts that arise are taken on a case by case basis. They are aware of
constraints on their country and the constraints on other countries. They are also aware that there
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are international situations where cooperation is possible and beneficial (Gorener & Ucal, 2011;
Hermann, 2003; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001).
Analysis
The results of the LTA on Mao and Xi show that these leaders have some similarities, but
results also show differences in key areas that indicate the leaders have slightly different
approaches to leadership. A side by side comparison of how each leader scored can be found in
the Table 3.8. Mao and Xi showed differences in their scores for DIS, SC and CC. Mao and Xi
showed similarities in their scores for TASK, BACE, IGB, and PWR.
Mao and Xi scored low on BACE and PWR which indicated that each of these leaders
respects constraints in their environments. This analysis indicates that Mao and Xi are unlikely to
see the world as something that they can change and will be less likely to seek direct control in
every situation. These results indicate that these leaders will look to share power and seek
consensus when making decisions (Hermann, 2003). This shows a major similarity between the
leaders, but not in an expected way. The original hypothesis was that these leaders would believe
that they have a direct effect on the world and that they would seek out direct control of every
situation.
These leaders’ scores for TASK place them in the average range of scores and make it
likely that they will fluctuate between a focus on solving problems and a focus on building
relationships. This is considered a charismatic leader and is common between democratically
elected leaders (Hermann, 2003). This result is interesting for these leaders, these leaders seem to
be focused on solving problems that the PRC is facing as a communist country, but these leaders
have had a need to win public opinion over to effectively execute their causes. This result sheds
light on the balance needed to be a leader in the PRC.
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Mao and Xi both scored low on IGB, making it unlikely that they will show a preference
for one group over another and are unlikely to use scapegoats to deal with domestic issues
(Hermann, 2003). This is a surprising result; both of these leaders have shown a history of
suppression of minority groups and have historically favored the majority Han ethnicity.
Additionally, Mao is famous for blaming whole groups of people for policy shortcomings of the
PRC.
Both leaders’ CC scores indicate that both Core Leaders seek out information when
facing a major decision. Interestingly, Mao scored in the high range for this variable indicating
that he would often seek out a large amount of information before making a decision (Herman,
2003). Xi scored in the moderate range for this score, indicating that he would sometimes look
for a large amount of information, but in some situations he may look for less information before
a decision is reached (Herman, 2003). This shows a clear difference between the two leaders and
one that was not originally expected. Surprisingly, this shows that Mao may have been more
likely to consider other perspectives than Xi is.
Mao had a higher score on SC, indicating a higher likelihood he would believe in his own
abilities on an issue and Xi is more likely to rely on other people to augment his weaknesses in
certain policy areas. Based on these speeches, it appears that Mao was also less likely than Xi to
change his opinions when met with new information, especially on policies that he has a strong
belief in. Mao scored in the moderate range which indicates that sometimes he is completely sure
of his actions and other times not so much (Hermann, 2003). Xi scored in the low range for this
score indicating that he is likely to rely on others more often than Mao. Both of these leaders’
scores indicate that they are open to information and would seek out other opinions rather than
their instincts on an issue (Hermann, 2003).
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Another interesting difference between these leaders is Mao’s higher score on DIS.
Mao’s higher scores on this variable indicates that the revolutionary leader was more critical and
suspicious of the motives of the people around him than Xi is. But, in general Mao falls in the
moderate range for this score making his level of distrust dependent on the context of the
situation (Hermann, 2003).
Table 3.8 Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping comparison
LTA Characteristics

Mao Zedong

Xi Jinping

DIS

Mid

Low

Task

Mid

Mid

BACE

Mid

Low

IGB

Low

Low

SC

Mid

Low

CC

High

Mid

PWR

Low

Low

Conclusion
The analysis conducted in this chapter does not support the original hypothesis, showing
marked differences in the leadership styles of Xi Jinping and Mao Zedong. An analysis of the
LTA results shows characteristics that do not align with the original assumptions considered. The
next chapters will take an in-depth look at the text of the speeches and the historical context of
each speech. An in-depth look at key speeches could help display the strengths and limitations of
Leadership Trait Analysis when applied to the PRC. A look at the historical context of each
leader can shed more light on the key approaches each leader has taken and whether this method
holds up against how the leader has actually acted. This will help to take a critical look at how
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this approach holds up in face of a wide use of rhetoric and leader’s saying one thing and acting
in other ways.
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Ch. 4: Speeches in Context
Introduction
The previous chapters have examined elites in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and
the results of a leadership trait analysis of speeches given by Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping. This
chapter extends the analysis by taking a closer look at several key speeches from each leader.
The themes of the speeches, the overall tone of each speech and the speeches’ context are
considered in order to better understand each leader and their time in power.
Elite speeches are important in understanding what a leader sees as important for the
country and can give insight into a leader’s individual characteristics. These speeches deserve
more attention than what Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) can provide. LTA looks at the
underlying features of a speech, but looking at the speeches in context of the surrounding events
can provide an understanding into why that speech was given and what purpose it served the
leader. In general, speeches are scripted and delivered for a specific reason. In China this is true
as well, but due to a lack of free press and the closed nature of the political system, these
speeches can give insight into what problems the Party sees as most important. Elite speeches are
especially scripted and may even be changed when reprinted to create a different tone or
meaning than was originally given. Additionally, speeches may contain a wide use of rhetoric
that may not be turned into action. This makes it especially important to look at the context and
impact of the speeches (Hermann, 2003; Li, 2016; Cheek, 2010).
For this chapter, speeches were selected in a way to obtain the broadest view of each
leader. To be able to make the best impact for this analysis the speeches examined needed to be
during important events in the leader’s history and needed to include a wide variety of topics.
This allows for meaningful comparisons to be drawn from the two leaders. Due to the volume of
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speeches and the fact that Mao delivered a substantially larger amount of speeches more than Xi,
three speeches were selected for each leader to gain a deeper analysis of each individual speech.
Speeches that are on a variety of topics and that were given during important events were
selected for each.
Analyzing these speeches could aid in understanding how the leaders portray themselves
and their policies with the public. A general understanding of the differences between the time of
Mao and that of Xi can be explored through their speeches as well. This examination can help
contextualize similarities and differences between the two leaders. This chapter will discuss the
leaders’ speeches, charting key elements and phrases and comparing the leaders together. This
will assist in determining how comparisons can be drawn between these two leaders or how stark
the differences between them really are.
Mao Zedong’s Speeches
“The Importance of the Peasant Problem” (March, 1927)
When this speech was delivered, the CCP was only six years old and had recently formed
an uneasy alliance with the Kuomintang (KMT). This speech was delivered in 1927 during a
time when Mao was looking to gain support for his movement against the nationalist party and
was building a peasant class movement of his own. Mao was sent to Hunan by the CCP, tasked
with exploring the debate between a rural or urban focus of the young political party. The
traditional Marxist view was that the best supporters of the Party would be from the areas
surrounding the cities and the rural peasants would serve as a secondary line of revolution (Karl,
2010). Mao challenged this, strongly siding with a rural emphasis supported by a peasant army.
There was great debate around this issue and Mao’s idea of a peasant base was met with
disinterest among higher ranking officials who agreed with the classic interpretation of Marxist

62

ideology. The assignment to observe the peasant movement in Hunan was a way for Mao to gain
support for this army (Karl, 2010).
The CCP Chairman at the time, Chen Duxiu, vehemently disagreed with Mao’s desire to
bring peasants into the revolutionary movement. Chen believed that urban citizens would
continue to be the Party’s main source of support. Chen was also the main critic of the peasant
movement, upholding that the revolution would continue to be led by the leaders of the CCP.
Mao disagreed with this and argued that the movement would continue and would follow the
example of the peasant movement (Karl, 2010).
In this famous speech, Mao makes several observations about his so-called peasant
movement. Specifically, Mao observed that the negative aspects of the peasant movement that
had been widely discussed were not reflective of reality. Mao viewed the peasant movement as a
way to revitalize the CCP’s revolution and this speech expresses that view. He states that the
peasant movement is “a colossal event” and that the peasants would “rise like a mighty storm…”
and “sweep all the imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, local tyrants and evil gentry into their
graves” (Mao, 1965, pgs. 23-24). He provides three options as to how to deal with this
movement; join it, stand behind it and criticize it, or oppose it. He states that this choice would
need to be made quickly.
Mao breaks the peasant movement into two main parts. First, he categorizes an
organizational phase. He notes that during this phase, the countryside had seen relatively little
conflict and their numbers totaled less than one million. He names the second phase the
revolutionary action phase, where he states the membership of this movement at ten million. He
states that this movement had swelled quickly and that the peasants started “a revolution without
parallel in history” (Mao, 1965, pg. 25).
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“All power to the peasant association” (Mao, 1965, pg. 25) is the theme throughout this
speech. Mao states peasants are breaking through institutions of former oppression, labeling the
opposition as “the local tyrants, the evil gentry and the lawless landlords…” (Mao, 1965, pg. 25).
Mao states that these tyrants have been taken out of power, with the highest ranking members
fleeing to Shanghai and those that have remained behind “fry surrender to the peasant
associations in the villages” (Mao, 1965, pg. 25).
Mao criticizes the “evil gentry” (邪恶的绅士, xié'è de shēnshì) and those who did not
join this movement sooner. Those who are members of the old upper class are displayed as
begging to join the peasant association and the higher level peasants who had not joined are
criticized similarly, begging for sponsors to join. He states that the peasant movement will
threaten those outside their group with being placed on the “other register” (另册, lìngcè) which
amounts to being an enemy of the movement. Mao calls those who are not in the movement as
being “like tramps” (Mao, 1965, pg. 26). He also notes the change in the state of affairs in the
countryside with “those who formerly prostrated themselves before the power of the gentry now
bow before the power of the peasants” and states that the world is different than it was a year
before (Mao, 1965, pg. 26).
Mao criticizes those, such as Chen Duxiu, who see the peasant movement as useless.
Mao accuses Chen and others of attempting to preserve the old systems and to prevent “the
establishment of the new order of democracy” (Mao, 1965, pg. 27). Additionally, Mao displays
the peasants as “striking down the enemies who battened on their flesh!” (Mao, 1965, pg. 27). By
saying this, Mao is showing his approval of these movements and is clearly dividing the issue
into an us versus them mindset. He states that all revolutionaries should fully support this
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movement and that a change like this one is important for their revolutionary movement (Mao,
1965, pg. 27).
While defending the peasants, Mao states that peasants rob the “evil gentry” and that
“they even loll for a minute on the ivory-inlaid beds belonging to the young ladies in the
households…” (Mao, 1965, pg. 28). He discusses the belief among some that the peasants are
necessary but have gone too far with the acts they have committed against their old oppressors.
Disagreeing with this view, Mao defends these acts on the “lawless landlords” (pg. 28) and states
that these groups brought this on themselves by performing outrage on the peasant class. Mao
believes that the punishment does not exceed the crimes of the past. Furthermore, Mao famously
states that a revolution “is not a dinner party...it is an act of violence…” (Mao, 1965, pg. 28).
This characterization would later be carried out to extremes during Mao’s rule.
During Mao’s analysis of the peasant movement he breaks society into groups, an upper
class and lower class and further breaks those groups into subgroups of varying levels of wealth.
Each of these groups is either treated as good or bad as a whole and each subgroup is rated as the
better or worse segment of each group. He states his support for the peasant movement,
especially the poorest peasants, who he feels are the most dedicated of the group because they
have the least to lose. He also brands the richest of the upper class as the worst group and that all
actions against them are justified (Mao, 1965).
This essay was a way for Mao to earn more approval for these movements among the
communist party. With this speech, Mao makes a strong case in support of the peasant
movement. He makes it clear throughout his speech that to be a revolutionary it is essential to
fully support the peasants and in turn the success of the revolution rests with the peasants. This
speech was clearly directed at Chen Duxiu, the General Secretary of the CCP Central
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Committee, to undermine his argument on the peasant movement and to make it difficult for him
to continue to speak against the peasants (Karl, 2010).
After this speech was given, the KMT began to turn on the peasant movement. Mao’s
writings in continued support of the peasant movement, against Marxist orthodoxy which valued
urban revolutionaries, allowed him to gain their support against the KMT. Due to this support,
the KMT began the “White Terror,” beginning attacks on the peasants and other CCP supporting
organizations deemed as radicals. CCP members were nearly eradicated, Mao and the remaining
CCP members fled into distant rural areas to begin to recreate their movement in the rural
communities (Karl, 2010).
“The Chinese People Have Stood Up!” (September 21, 1949)
After twenty years of continued conflict with the KMT, Mao was able rebuild his army
and defeat the KMT. This speech is given during the Chinese People’s Consultative Congress
(CPPCC) in Beijing, where he addresses groups who have committed to working under the CCP.
This speech indicates what the Chinese people have accomplished and sets the tone for how the
country will proceed (Karl, 2010). In his address, Mao unilaterally declares victory over “the
reactionary KMT government backed by U.S. imperialism” and declared that the Chinese army,
“an army such as the world has seldom seen,” has put the KMT on the defensive. Mao pointedly
declares that the majority of people in China have experienced “liberation” (解放, jiěfàng)
(Mao, 1977, pg. 15).
Mao states that in the previous three years (1947-1949), at the height of civil war with
KMT, the Chinese people have learned a valuable lesson, that when it comes to “the running dog
of imperialism” they must “overthrow these enemies or be oppressed and slaughtered by them”
(Mao, 1977, pg. 16). Mao contends that no other choice exists when it comes to the KMT army
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and he exalted the CCP army’s ability to defeat the KMT’s government and overthrow
imperialism in China (Mao, 1977).
Mao declares that “the Chinese people, comprising one quarter of humanity, have now
stood up” (中國人民從此站起來了, zhōngguó rénmín cóngcǐ zhàn qǐláile) and that this action
was a turning point in the history of mankind. He continues to state that they have done what
previous revolutionaries failed to do and that China “will no longer be a nation subject to insult
and humiliation” (Mao, 1977, pg. 17). Mao states that the work is not finished with this act and
that the nation still needs to continue to fight off reactionaries (Mao, 1977).
At this point, the civil war between the CCP and the KMT had not yet concluded.
Nevertheless, the CCP is on the verge of declaring victory, and Mao uses this speech to express
how the conflict will continue even after their victory. Mao indicates that even “after there is
peace and order throughout the country” these reactionaries will continue to oppose the new
government (Mao, 1977, pg. 18). Mao argues that there will be a constant struggle against these
groups and that the Chinese people will need to remain vigilant against them. Finally, Mao states
that “the era in which the Chinese people were regarded as uncivilized is now ended” and that an
increase in production and development is essential to make China a global competitor (Mao,
1977, pg. 18).
This speech was given by a revolutionary on the night of his unilateral declaration of
victory, i.e. the nationalist party did not accept defeat and many countries did not recognize the
CCP’s government for years or even decades. During this speech, Mao lays the foundation for
how he will lead the new state. He indicates that China will push to modernize and that they will
need to constantly be on the lookout for those who oppose their new system. Mao indicates that
there will always be people in China who try to oppose the changes of the new government and
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warns that the people need to be vigilant in looking for these reactionaries. This speech
foreshadows how Mao’s governing style would be and provides some insight to his worldview.
Through this speech you can see that Mao sees governing as a struggle and he mentions how this
struggle will be constant. Even when everything is perfect, Mao argues that there will still be
people who oppose the system and that these people should be resisted. This address provides
insight into how a revolutionary leader is affected by the struggles that occur before victory. Mao
was always on edge that his victory in China would be resisted and he governed the country in a
way that is reflective of that and this speech foreshadows that behavior (Mao, 1977).
“On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People” (February 27, 1957)
This speech was delivered near the end of Mao’s first five-year economic plan (19531957). The structure outlined in this plan aimed to rapidly shift production from agricultural
dominance to industrial growth, and with a focus targeted on steel production. These policies led
to a dramatic decline in the food supply and general unrest throughout the country. That
culminated, after another campaign led by Mao, in one of the world’s most devastating humanmade famines (Karl, 2010). Mao’s policies had led to a stagnant economy and a wasteful
bureaucratic system. In this speech Mao sets up the so-called “100 Flowers” movement of open
criticism of the government (Cheek, 2010).
Mao breaks this speech into twelve sections. Within the first section, Mao describes the
country as “united” that the “victories of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and socialist
revolution… have rapidly changed the face of China” (Mao, 1977, pg. 384). He states that the
old class systems that they had fought against were “...gone, never to return” (pg. 384). Mao says
that even with this victory, contradictions (矛盾, máodùn) still exist in society and two main
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forms are the topic of his discussion. The first form is “between ourselves and the enemy” and
the second is “those among the people” (Mao, 1977, pg. 384).
Mao separates “the people” from “the enemy” (Mao, 1977, pg. 385) He states that “the
people” (人民, rénmín) (pg. 385) is a changing term that has different definitions in different
situations. For example, when resisting Japanese imperialism, the people were those who resisted
and the enemy were those who joined with the Japanese. During the time this speech was given
“the people” are those who join with building socialism in China and the enemy are anyone who
resists socialism or works to “sabotage socialist construction” (Mao, 1977, pg. 385).
Speaking on how to handle different forms of contradiction, Mao makes a distinction
between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions. He states that the struggles between
the current day working class and the national bourgeoisie falls under the category of struggles
amongst the people. Mao states that “exploitation of the working class for profit” (Mao, 1977,
pg.385) only makes up one aspect of the national bourgeoisie and because this group respects the
constitution, they do not fall into the “enemy” group and instead can be handled in a way to
avoid escalation. He states that this group will remain outside of the “enemy” group as long as
they accept the changes of socialism (Mao, 1977). He notes that the contradictions in socialist
society are not antagonistic and the socialist system can easily solve these issues. In multiple
places, Mao states that the problems of their system are similar to those in capitalist systems, but
the new system is better because “if it were not so, the old system would not have been
overthrown and the new system could not have been established” (Mao, 1977, pg. 393).
However, Mao states that the contradictions between ourselves and the enemy need to be
handled differently. To do this you have to “draw a clear distinction between ourselves and the
enemy” and “draw a clear distinction between right and wrong” but continues to say that, “it is of
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course true that a distinction between ourselves and the enemy is also one of right and wrong”
(Mao, 1977, pg. 386). When dealing with the enemy, Mao describes the goal of their government
as suppressing “exploiters who resist the socialist revolution” and “those who try to wreck our
socialist construction” or as he puts it more succinctly, “to resolve the contradiction between
ourselves and the internal enemy” (Mao, 1977, pg. 386). He states that it is the government’s job
to “deprive” groups of their right to vote or free speech in order to “maintain public order and
safeguard the interests of the people” and Mao says that the second function of the government is
to protect from similar external threats. Mao describes his government as a democratic
dictatorship and when dealing with the enemy it should act as a dictatorship and when dealing
with the people it should act as a democracy. He does note that sometimes “good people were
mistaken for bad, and such things still happen today” (Mao, 1977, pg. 392).
With this speech, Mao breaks Chinese society into two main groups an us group and a
them group. The composition of each group is intentionally vague and Mao has a free ability to
change who is in what group, but the main difference between groups is support of the
government. Some issues he sees as being able to be solved within the current scope of the
government, but he gives warning that if they are not resolved then they will be labeled as an
enemy. The us group is given protections and allowed to participate in the democracy, but the
them group is met with the dictatorship and is suppressed. He states that these groupings are not
permanent and can change giving him free reign to suppress any group that was in opposition
(Mao, 1977).
During this speech, Mao often talks of groups oppressing one another. When speaking on
why the peasants lead a hard life, he says that it is due to the level of oppression that they faced
under the imperialists. He states that they will need several decades of hard work to correct this
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and notes the changes in conditions since the old system was overthrown. When dealing with
criticism over the current situation he describes the old system as much worse and states that “no
one can say that there has been no improvement in the life of the peasants” (Mao, 1977, pg. 401).
Mao describes several groups found in society and expresses how they are important to
further develop China. Mao states that counter-revolutionaries still exist, despite the thought of
the day, and need to be eliminated. Mao believes that intellectuals are no longer interested in
participating in politics and that this group needs to continue to study Marxism and work to
improve Chinese Socialism. Finally, on minority groups, Mao states that it is important to end
the preference for the Han ethnicity and to incorporate other minority groups into Chinese
society. Mao states that each of these groups could be dangerous to Chinese society if they are
not fully incorporated (Mao, 1977).
Mao lays out what he considers to be acceptable behavior from the people and the
government. He states that the people should have a freedom of ideas and of assembly, but also
indicates that these freedoms are only insured as long as the individual does not oppose the
socialist society that Mao is trying to build. Mao also states that individuals can criticize
Marxism, but these individuals and their ideas need to move forward with the direction of the
country and can only serve to improve the current system, not disrupt it. Mao also indicates that
disruptions would not be tolerated. He contends that the current system can resolve the issues
that the people face, these people can criticize the system which will led to the correction, but he
makes it clear that disrupting society for a cause is not seen as necessary and will not be tolerated
by the government (Mao, 1977).
Mao provides room to respond to any disruptions that might be caused from these
policies. This speech makes Mao’s stance on dissent against the government very clear. Most of
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the allowances given for political criticism in this speech are easily taken away by changing how
he labeled certain groups of people and when groups openly opposed Mao he quickly declares
them the enemy and they were met with the dictatorial handling style expressed for dealing with
the enemy. This speech gave allowances to loyal criticisms of the government, but when these
criticisms started to be given Mao did not like what he heard. Mao quickly labeled these
criticisms as anti-revolutionary and rightist. This speech was also rewritten before its publication
to make Mao look better and to change how allowable it made criticisms. The movement caused
by this speech led many intellectuals and party members to be purged (Cheek, 2010).
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Table 4.1: Mao Zedong’s Speeches
Speech

Context

Tone

Themes

“Peasants” 1927

CCP was newly
established,
debate between
using an urban or
a rural base

Highly critical
of those who
oppose the
peasant
movement

Struggle,
revolution,
rebuilding the
base support of
the Party

“Stood Up” 1949 Just prior to the
declaration of
PRC, given
while the war
with the KMT
was still ongoing

Low level of
optimism
layered with
uncertainty
toward the
future

“Contradictions”
1957

Positive for the
future but,
critical of the
current system

End of first five
year plan, sets
the stage for the
short lived
public criticism
movement called
the 100 flowers
movement

Key Words/
phrases
Peasants,
peasant
organizations,
“other
register”,
oppression

Purpose

Impact

To outline the
rural mobilization
strategy of the
CCP and to
undermine the
debate against the
peasant
movement

Unity,
strength,
continued
revolution,
rebuilding the
country

Reactionaries,
victory,
struggle

Acceptance of
criticisms from
the people and
crackdown on
criticisms from
the enemies

Contradiction
s
“The people”,
enemies,
revolution,
criticisms,
oppression,
intellectuals

Set stage for
PRC,
delegitimized the
KMT, set the
stage for the CCP
government under
Mao leadership
CCP must purify
its ranks, internal
enemies could be
the most
dangerous with a
focus on
intellectuals in
society

Led to a KMT
crackdown on
peasant
organizations and
set forth Mao’s
rural strategy to
reshape and
revitalize the CCP
movement
This imagery is
used consistently
in the PRC

One of Mao’s
most important
speeches, allowed
Mao to justify the
crackdown and
purges especially
those on antirightists

Douglas 73

Xi Jinping’s Speeches
“The People’s Wish for a Good Life Is Our Goal” (November 15, 2012)
In the first speech that Xi Jinping delivered as the General Secretary of the CCP Central
Committee, Xi expresses his goals for the Party and the Chinese people. Prior to delivering this
address, Xi had been absent from public view for two weeks. Xi had been all but named to the
top spot and during the time when the media was looking for more information on the emerging
leader, he was nowhere to be found. The official statement for Xi’s disappearance was that he
had injured his back while swimming but, most now believe this was a silent protest on political
positions that Xi wanted full control over (Li, 2016). In particular, this was due to the fact that
Hu Jintao was not willing to vacate all of his positions at once, but planned to continue as
Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman for at least one year, as Jiang Zemin had done in
2002. Xi’s protest suggests that he did not want to share leadership, but instead wanted to assume
all leadership positions without waiting like Hu did when he ascended to Core Leader. In
exchange for Hu vacating all positions he was allowed to make several top appointments to the
CMC (Lam, 2015; Li, 2016).
In this address, Xi speaks in encouraging tones. He expresses his gratitude for being
selected for this position and wishes to “express our thanks to all other members of the Party for
their trust in us” (Xi, 2015, pg.3). Xi talks about the trust that is being provided to the new
leadership and specifically mentions that it is their duty to serve people all across China
including people of all ethnic groups (Xi, 2015). The focus of this speech highlights the poor
success of the administration of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao (2002 - 2012) on reaching their goals.
He mentions staples of the previous administrations and indicates that these goals have not been
met and that he plans on continuing them but to be more successful. Hu’s campaign to develop
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the west was seen as mediocre in terms of area development and in this speech Xi discusses
working with these ethnic groups to further develop their regions (Lam, 2015; Li, 2016).
Xi expresses that the leadership is taking on an important responsibility to lead a “great
nation,” noting that the “Chinese nation has made significant contributions to the progress of
human civilization” (Xi, 2015, pg. 3). Xi continues to discuss the struggles of the Chinese
people, especially those prior to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) foundation in 1921. Xi
mentions the “great people” (伟大的人, wěidà de rén) who attempted to stand against oppressors
in China and the CCP’s successful attempt at “transforming poor and backward China into an
increasingly prosperous and strong nation” (Xi, 2015, pg. 3).
Xi states that the new leadership is “taking on this important responsibility for the
people” and that they must rally all the people of China from every ethnic group. Xi expresses
his goal to work with the Chinese people to stand stronger amongst the other nations of the
world. Xi states that the Chinese people have “worked with diligence, bravery and wisdom,
creating a beautiful homeland where all ethnic groups live in harmony” (Xi, 2015, pg. 4). He
describes the desires of the Chinese people stating that they wish for a better life and more
opportunities, for themselves and their children. Xi highlights that “the people’s wish for a happy
life is our mission” (人民幸福生活的愿望是我们的使命, rénmín xìngfú shēnghuó de
yuànwàng shì wǒmen de shǐmìng) and indicates that this will come from hard work and that he
hopes to lead the people of China through further reform and opening up to “pursue common
prosperity” (Xi, 2015, pg. 4).
Xi states that the party has made great strides in serving the people and that the party has
led the people to great achievements, but that the Chinese people “should never be complacent
and rest on our laurels” (Xi, 2015 pgs. 4). Xi then expands on what his goals will be moving
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forward, including addressing corruption in the party and a lack of connection between the party
and the people. Xi believes that for these issues “the whole party must stay on full alert” and that
they need “to work with all Party members to uphold the principle that the Party should
supervise its own conduct” (Xi, 2015 pgs. 5).
Xi stresses that “the people” are the real heroes of the country and he believes that the
government should work with the people and increase ties between the Party and the people. Xi
states “one can only work for a limited period of time, but there is no limit to serving the people
with dedication” (Xi, 2015, pg. 5) Xi believes that the government should work together with the
people to improve the system and to continue “advancing socialism with Chinese
characteristics.” Xi finishes his speech by expressing a need for China to learn more about the
outside world and for the outside world to learn more about China (Xi, 2015, pg. 5).
Xi’s key points in this speech include working with the people, ethnic cooperation, and
international cooperation. He mentions the importance of working with the people, including
minority ethnic groups. Xi states that he and the rest of the leadership will work to serve all of
the people of China and will work to build bonds between the Party and the people it represents.
Xi’s speech sets an optimistic tone, when he is expressing issues that the nation and Party face he
does not exclude any groups. He does not express these issues in an us versus them way, but
instead as hurdles the entire nation needs to get over together. Xi also quickly mentions other
nations and the outside world. He indicates that he is hoping to build stronger relationships with
other nations. He expresses these hopes in a way that indicates that China will join the
international community as partners not competitors (Xi, 2015).
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“Uphold and Develop Socialism With Chinese Characteristics” (January 5, 2013)
The theme of this speech is “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (中国特色社会主
义, Zhōngguó tèsè shèhuì zhǔyì) (Xi, 2015, pg. 23), a characterization of China’s unique
ideological path that was originally developed by Deng Xiaoping. Deng developed this phrase in
the 1980s when he began his campaign to advance China’s economy. This phrase was used to
justify the PRC’s increasingly capitalist emphasis while maintaining that the country has not
discarded Marxism, but instead has developed from the lessons of the past. It is said to be based
off of the idea of scientific socialism or a version of socialism that allows for a trial and error
approach to economic advancement (Lampton, 2014; Li, 2016; Vogel, 2011).
This speech was delivered to the Central Committee of the CCP to set the standard for
moving forward from the beginning of the 18th National Congress. In this speech Xi speaks on
“socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Xi, 2015, pg. 23). For Xi, this means a form of
socialism that is tailored to the history of the Chinese people. Xi states that socialism with
Chinese characteristics addresses the desires of the people and “meets the development needs of
the country” (Xi, 2015, pg. 23). For Xi, this idea is what should motivate the leaders of the CCP
in their actions and whatever they do should be in line with renewing the Chinese nation and
should work to build socialism with Chinese characteristics (Xi, 2015).
Xi calls for CCP officials to be aware of the changes in the country and to be able to
adapt their work to the needs of the people. Xi believes that the Party should be able to “blaze
new trails, bridge rivers, forge ahead with determination…” and that the CCP should be able to
“come up with solutions” to problems that the country faces (Xi, 2015, pg. 23). Xi calls for a
continued effort in opening up (开放, kāifàng) the country and deepening reform (深化改革,
shēnhuà gǎigé) which were some of Deng Xiaoping’s main platforms. Xi talks of continuing to
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open up China to foreign investment and to continue to reform the Chinese economic system (Xi,
2015, pg. 24).
Xi believes that socialism should be “pure socialism and nothing else” and that “only
socialism can save China and only socialism with Chinese characteristics can bring development
to China” (Xi, 2015, pg. 24). Xi believes that the country should stick with socialism and that as
socialism progresses “the strengths of our system will become self-evident, and our development
path will assuredly become wider” (Xi, 2015, pg. 23). He declares that the Chinese people need
to have faith in their path and to be sure of the system in place so that the PRC can fully develop
and become a strong country under socialism (Xi, 2015, pg. 23).
Xi states that the process of developing socialism in China was a two-part process, the
pre-opening up era (1978) and the post-opening up era. He notes that these eras are “at once
related and distinct from each other” (Xi, 2015, pg. 24). He believes that each of these eras
taught the Chinese people lessons in how to develop a socialist society and that each era was
important to get the PRC to where it is today and that the CCP should continue to build off the
knowledge that was earned in these periods (Xi, 2015).
Xi exalts the foundations laid by Deng Xiaoping and what Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao
had done to continue this work, but he states that “Marxism will not remain stagnant” and “the
job of the Communists of our generation is to continue with this mission” (Xi, 2015, pg. 25). Xi
argues that the CCP should continue to adhere to Marxism, but the CCP will continue to “face
greater risks and challenges, and we will be confronted by the unexpected” (Xi, 2015, pg. 25). Xi
believes that the CCP should be prepared for these challenges and should address challenges as
they arise by learning “what we do not know” (Xi, 2015, pg. 25).
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Xi declares that Party members “must be rigorous in implementing the Party’s basic lines
and programs in the primary stage of socialism, and do all our work well” (Xi, 2015, pg. 25). He
also notes that “a Party member devoid of ideals lacks an essential quality” (Xi, 2015, pg. 26).
Finally, Xi declares that “flawed thinking, hedonistic desires, corrupt behaviors and passive
attitudes - all are at odds with the highest communist ideals” (Xi, 2015, pg. 26).
This speech sets Xi up as a leader who has a very fundamental view of what socialism is
and what socialism’s role in the PRC should be. As this speech progresses, Xi makes it clear that
he supports the work the past leaders have done to advance socialism in China, but he also
indicates that these efforts have not been enough. He overtly states that the party leaders need to
do more to advance socialism in China. With this speech Xi lays out what he believes the leaders
should do moving forward and is critical of the behaviors of some of the leaders in the past.
Xi describes what socialism has been in the past and what it should continue to be in the
future and he believes that socialism should be ideal driven and opens up the idea that some
leaders in the party do not have this ideal. He uses this speech to make it clear that the CCP does
not have room for those that are corrupt or passive in their duties. This speech provides Xi a lot
of room to declare the actions of Party members as counter to the Party’s beliefs and helps set the
stage for Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and other Party restructuring and purges.
“Address to the First Session of the 12th National People’s Congress” (March 17, 2013)
In late 2012 and early 2013, Xi Jinping toured the country in hopes to identify areas that
could be utilized for further economic growth. On this tour Xi develops his economic policy for
his signature emphasis, the so-called “Chinese Dream” and further development of the western
provinces. He also expresses a desire to further strengthen China’s ability militarily (Lam, 2015;
Li, 2016). Xi’s 2012 tour parallels a similar tour taken in 1992 by Deng Xiaoping. Deng’s
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“Southern Tour” was an unannounced examination of the economic developments of the south.
Deng was very critical of CCP officials giving too many speeches and not doing enough work to
further reform the PRC and Deng called for party leaders to speed up development. During this
time Deng also called for more foreign investment in state controlled businesses to further
develop the south (Vogel, 2011). In both of these leaders’ tours there was a heavy focus on
economic development and Xi likely modeled his 2012 tour of the south after that of Deng’s.
This address was delivered during the 1st session of the 12th National People’s Congress
meeting when Xi was named the President of the PRC. In this address, Xi lays the foundation for
his two main emphases as the leader of the PRC; the anti-corruption campaign (反腐运动, Fǎnfǔ
yùndòng) and his ideal of a Chinese Dream (中国梦, Zhōngguó mèng). The Chinese Dream is
Xi’s idea of rejuvenating the Chinese economy and allowing every Chinese to live a middle class
lifestyle. When Xi speaks of national rejuvenation he is referring to reviving the ability of lower
class people to be able to rise into the middle class ranks. He is hoping to increase the mood of
the people and their willingness and capability to work (Li, 2016).
In this opening address, Xi expresses how he will uphold the responsibilities of the office
and quickly expresses how the CCP has seen four previous generations of leadership and the
improvements that China has made under the previous leaders. Xi states that “the people of all
ethnic groups have… surmounted all difficulties and obstacles on our way ahead, made worldrenowned achievements” (Xi, 2015, pg. 40).
Xi states that over the nation’s 5,000 years of existence the thing that has held the country
and all of its ethnic groups together has been its constant struggles and “the ideals and vision”
that is shared by all Chinese. Xi declares that he will continue to work for the goals of “the
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Chinese Dream of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (中华民族的复兴, Zhōnghuá mínzú de
fùxīng)” and to bring happiness to the Chinese people (Xi, 2015, pg. 41).
Xi indicates that there is a “mighty tide of the times and the great expectations of the
people for a better life” and states that leaders should not “slacken off in the slightest” (Xi, 2015,
pg. 42). Xi continues to speak on pursuing progress for the PRC. He indicates that this is possible
due to the efforts of reform and opening up that has taken place over the last 30 years in China.
Xi indicates that the path he hopes to set the country on is based in China’s long history and that
the people of every ethnic group should “steadfastly forge ahead along the correct Chinese path”
(Xi, 2015, pg. 42).
Xi argues that “to realize the Chinese Dream, we must foster the Chinese spirit” (Xi,
2015, pg. 42). This spirit is described as patriotism and Xi indicates that patriotism has been an
important part of Chinese history and development. Xi hopes that the Chinese people will band
together to work to realize the Chinese Dream and “strengthen our inner bond of unity and
perseverance, and vigorously march towards the future.” Xi states that to accomplish the Chinese
Dream all ethnic groups will need to work together and pull their strength. He indicates that if all
the Chinese people work together they will be able to make great accomplishments and obtain
the Chinese Dream. Finally, Xi calls the Chinese Dream “the dream of the people” and calls for
the reliance on the people to accomplish this task (Xi, 2015, pgs. 42-43).
Xi follows this by arguing to improve the use of people’s congresses as the fundamental
political system in China and to increase community level self-governing. He hopes to set a
strong foundation for the people to be able to build their Chinese Dream. Xi then indicates that
economic development should serve as a focus of the party and that the party should seek to
improve “socialist economic, political, social and ecological advancement” (Xi, 2015, pg. 43)
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Xi expresses the need for the government’s work to meet the people’s expectations and
increase the people’s livelihoods. He indicates that the government should work to promote the
people’s involvement in government and to provide the people with education, employment and
medical care. Xi stresses the need to “develop socialist ethnic relations of equality” and to
promote harmony in society. He states that people with all levels of education and in different
social classes should all work diligently to improve the development of the nation (Xi, 2015, pg.
44).
Xi speaks of a desire to continue to open China up to its neighbors and other countries of
the world. He states: “we Chinese people are peace-loving people” (Xi, 2015, pg. 45) Xi
indicates that he will work to build China as an international player and will ensure that China
meets the needs of the other nations in the world. Xi hopes to “advance the lofty cause of peace
and development of mankind” (Xi, 2015, pg. 45).
Xi concludes by stating that “all our party members, leading officials in particular, should
be firm in our belief, always place the people above all else…” (Xi, 2015, pg. 45). He indicates
that he wishes to continue the tradition of the party in combating corruption and building
Chinese socialism. Finally, that the Chinese people and the Party need to work diligently in
continuing to make progress and accomplish great achievements.
With this speech, Xi continues to create a feeling of optimism for China’s future. He
shows a dedication to opposing corruption in the government and to working with people from
all walks of life; setting the stage for his signature anti-corruption campaign. He indicates that he
wants everyone from the farmers to the academics to use their abilities to make China a better
country. During this he does not put one group over another and speaks for inclusion and
cooperation between the different groups, especially ethnic groups, in society. Xi also shows that
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he believes that the Party is second to the people and he wants to return the power to the people
of China. After giving this speech, Xi works to make an economy that meets the needs of the
middle class and allows lower class citizens to move into the middle class in an attempt to fulfill
the Chinese Dream. Xi also speaks of rejuvenating the Chinese nation, to make China a stronger
country and to increase the citizen’s dedication to the communist party (Li, 2016). Once again Xi
does not indicate that there is anyone to blame for the issues that he hopes to correct, but only
states that it will take the cooperation of all of China to fix these issues.
To follow through on his promises against anti-corruption, Xi worked to have over 160
government officials brought up on corruption charges. Many of these individuals were long
serving CCP members and may have been a threat to Xi’s total control of the government with
many of these officials being aligned to the previous administrations, making this more of a
politically motivated act instead of at the interest of the Chinese people. This anti-corruption
movement led by Xi has been seen to be a move to further consolidate power under Xi and limit
the involvement of outside influences especially those of previous leaders. With this speech and
the following moves for power many officials believed that the era of collective leadership had
ended and that a new era of strongman leadership had begun (Li, 2016).
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Table 4.2: Xi Jinping’s Speeches
Speech

Context

Tone

Themes

Key
words/phrases

Purpose

Impact

“The People’s
Wish” 2012

Given during the
First plenary of
the 18th CCP
Central
Committee, Xi
was missing for
over two weeks
before delivering
this speech

Optimistic,
looking
forward,
peaceful,
humble

Ethnic
cooperation,
moving forward,
the people’s
wish for a good
life, reaffirming
the
government’s
commitment to
the people

Trust, “great
people”
wish for a good
life

To highlight the key
emphases of the new
administration, to transition
from the policies and
campaigns of the previous
leadership

Set the stage for Xi’s
administration and what
expectations Xi had for the
future of the CCP and the
PRC

“Uphold and
Develop
Socialism With
Chinese
Characteristics”
2013

Given to the
Central
Committee shortly
after the 18th
National Congress

Critical of
the current
methods of
governing,
while
reaffirming
the old
beliefs

Marxism,
scientific
socialism,
economic
development,
“deepening
reforms”,
“opening up”,
corruption, ideals

To give direction to the newly
elected Central Committee,
Xi states how he believes the
country should be governed
and what standard should be
upheld

Xi gave himself room to
criticize the actions of party
leaders as not being
socialist enough while also
describing what that means
and how they should move
forward

“12th National
People’s
Congress”
2013

Given during the
1st session of the
12th National
People’s Congress

Optimistic

Socialism with
Chinese
characteristics,
adapting to
changing
situations,
learning from
the past,
upholding
Marxism
Rejuvenation of
the Chinese
nation, fighting
corruption at all
levels

The Chinese
Dream, anticorruption
harmony,
struggle,
rejuvenation

To set the stage for the
necessary struggle to create
the “Chinese Dream”, to
illustrate the goals of the
Chinese people and the Xi
administration

Led to Xi’s anti-corruption
campaign and
the creation of several
government agencies that
Xi would chair
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Analysis
Analysis of these speeches helps to understand similarities and differences between Mao
and Xi. For example, the tones of each speech are similarly optimistic, but Mao undercuts this
optimism with a consistent view that society is constantly at odds. A second important difference
is that Mao is quick to break society into groups, mainly an us group and a them group.
In each of these speeches, Mao and Xi both indicate the great things that the Chinese
nation is capable of. They both reference the age of the nation and the struggles that the state has
endured to produce great achievements. Where these two leaders separate is that Mao indicates
that there will always be someone in opposition to the state’s desires. Mao also stresses the need
to oppose and suppress these dissidents when they arise. Mao indicates that these individuals will
always exist and the people need to be on guard against them.
Xi also indicates that the people need to be on guard, but the key difference is that Xi
wants the Chinese people to work together to obtain desirable results. He is also not speaking
about being on guard to stand against the opposition, but to be diligent against becoming
complacent with the progress they have already made. Xi’s speeches show that he believes that
China is on the path to greatness and that every Chinese person wants China to succeed in this
goal.
The differences between these two leaders are also shown in how they refer to different
segments of society. Mao’s speeches indicate that he was quick to break society into multiple
groups and he speaks about the importance of this practice. Mao believed that society should be
broken into “the people” and “the enemy” (Mao, 1977, pg. 385). These terms are vague and Mao
retained the ability to change who is in what group. Mao used this practice to declare groups of
people as enemies and turn society against them. The practice of labeling people who opposed
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Mao’s worldview as opposing socialism and Chinese advancement and these people were often
purged from the Party (Cheek, 2010).
Xi’s speeches indicate a more inclusive version of China. In Xi’s speeches he
consistently states that all ethnic groups and all other groups in China need to work together to
obtain the Chinese Dream (Xi, 2015). Although, these statements may not express how these
groups are actually treated by the Chinese government they give a far more overtly inclusive
tone. Mao’s speeches are overtly exclusive and clearly lay out what will earn someone a spot in
the out group. In comparison, Xi shows more ability in reaching a state of equality and openly
talks of that being a key goal of his administration.
Table 4.3 shows the distinctions that can be made between Mao and Xi. The overall tone
of the three speeches is more pessimistic for Mao and optimistic for Xi. Mao believes that the
communist party will continue to be opposed and the Chinese people will face a continued
revolution even after their victory. Xi shows optimism for the new administration and the goals
that he has set. Both of these leaders show a critical tone of the current environment, but Mao is
more critical of every aspect of the government and Xi is only critical of a few practices and
behaviors that he then gives goals to correct.
A difference emerged in the keywords of each speech; Mao was more likely to speak of
enemies and revolution. Mao was a revolutionary leader and even after his victory he continued
in this mindset. Conversely, Xi’s key words were more focused on continued reform and
economic development.
The impact of the speeches examined shows the differences between these leaders’
motivation for giving the speeches. Mao’s speeches were given before the CCP entered into new
campaigns and were generally given to gain support for the new movements. These movements
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then showed varying levels of success and mostly ended in government crackdowns or purges
(Cheek, 2010). Xi’s speeches mainly highlighted what the focus of the new administration would
be and would generally set the stage for his campaigns such as the anti-corruption campaign or
Chinese Dream (Li, 2016). The impact of the speeches can be described as the impact of the
campaign that they predate, which would make the impact of Mao’s speeches more severe. The
issue with this comparison is that Mao was the leader of China for four decades and Xi has been
the leader of China for four years. This creates an issue in the comparison of the impact of the
speeches because for Xi that impact could still be happening currently and may not be
completely clear until years later. When selecting speeches for Mao the most important speeches
have been discussed in great length and were easy to select. As a new leader it is completely
possible that Xi has yet to give his most important speech.
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Table 4.3: Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping
Leader
Mao Zedong

Context
Revolutionary
period, China that
was mostly secluded
from the
international
community

Tone
Pessimistic,
highly critical
of others,

Themes
Constant
struggle,
revolution,

Key Words
“The people”,
enemies,
revolution

Purpose
To advance the
CCP and to give
legitimacy to new
initiatives

Impact
Speeches were
given before
beginning new
initiatives which
often ended in
crackdowns or
purges of the
participants

Xi Jinping

Post-revolutionary
period, a China that
is on the rise and a
member of the
international
community

Optimistic,
slightly
critical of
current
practices in
the party

Unity,
cooperation,
moving
forward,
new ideas

Reform,
corruption,
Chinese
Dream,
economic
reforms

To express how
the new
administration
will be oriented
and to stress
expectations of
the CCP leaders

Led to Xi’s
staple campaigns
such as anticorruption and
the Chinese
Dream
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Conclusions
The analysis in this chapter highlights many of the differences between Mao Zedong and
Xi Jinping’s speeches, and their approaches to leadership. Mao’s speeches are delivered from the
viewpoint of a lifelong revolutionary, a fact that is often stated in very clear terms. Mao believed
that the revolution did not end with the defeat of the KMT, but continues as society develops,
including during his attempt to craft a “continuous revolution” from 1966-1976. Xi’s speeches
are given in a post-revolutionary perspective and due to this fact tend to have a more optimistic
harmonious tone, even if only in rhetoric. This shows a primary difference between these two
leaders. Mao is a revolutionary thinker who never cast that outlook aside while leading a nation
and Xi several generations removed from this revolution and is molded to the current political
system which is very bureaucratic. The China of Mao and that of Xi is also different in the sense
that the PRC is now an active member of the international system, China is more stable now and
has a much greater role in the region and world than in Mao’s time as Core Leader (Li, 2016).
In these speeches, the words chosen by Mao and Xi allow for room to change the
definitions in ways that are more advantageous to their agenda. Xi states that the Party does not
have room for those who do not follow the ideals of socialism and leaves room for what the
exact definition of that should be. He also indicates that the Party has no place for corruption and
uses this to gain political advantages over possible political opponents. This was a common
practice of Mao’s as well and in Mao’s speeches he also indicates that certain groups of people
should not be allowed protections, leaving himself ample room to decide who falls into what
categories. Mao constantly purged members of the government and Xi did similar purges during
his anti-corruption campaign under the guise of improving the Chinese people’s lives. In this
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regard, these leaders’ speeches provide some indication that they have similar approaches to
leadership.
An analysis of the content and context of these speeches further builds on the comparison
of these two leaders. These speeches show the differences between the leaders’ tones, word
choice and the underlying reasons behind each speech. Mao and Xi’s speeches show differences
in these categories and in how these leaders refer to the issues they face. This chapter has shown
that these leaders were members of different time periods and utilized different approaches to
responding to challenges in their environments.
The next section will look at this chapter and the previous chapters to draw a conclusion
to this study. By looking at all of these chapters together a determination of the limits of
Leadership Trait Analysis in this context can be drawn. This will allow for a critical analysis of
leadership studies in Chinese politics and the limitations that exist for this method and this study.
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Ch. 5: Conclusions
The driving question for this research has been whether Xi Jinping is the “new” Mao
Zedong. Does Xi Jinping’s leadership style resemble that of Chairman Mao? The implication of
this comparison is that, if Xi shows many similarities with Mao, then he will likely make similar
policy decisions. If this is true then Xi would be more likely to hold on to power and pursue
policies that could be potentially harmful to Chinese citizens, like Mao’s Great Leap Forward
and Cultural Revolution.
Although Mao did make some positive changes to China such as increasing access to
healthcare in the countryside, increasing gender opportunities and increasing literacy, the
negative policies are much more prominently discussed (Cheek, 2010; Karl, 2010). The policies
of Mao also created a country wide famine that may have killed 80 to 100 million people and
other policies of the Chairman left China isolated from the international environment and China
returning to this style of leadership is concerning for the country’s allies. This research has
examined the speeches given by these two leaders to determine if Xi is as similar to Mao as some
would suggest (Lam, 2015; Miller, 2014, 2016; Zhao, 2016). The results of this study suggest
that these two leaders are not as comparable as some may contend.
This study utilized Margaret Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) to analyze
speeches given by Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping (Hermann, 2003). Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping’s
results were compared to determine if their styles are the same, as was hypothesized. LTA shows
that these two leaders have some similarities but, more importantly, they exhibit differences in
key areas suggesting different approaches between the two leaders. Additionally, several key
speeches of each leader were examined in further depth to gain a fuller understanding of the two
leaders and the two time periods. These results suggest significant differences in each leader’s
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approach to leadership and considerable differences between the time periods. These results
show the impact of the differences in institutional restrictions on the “Core Leader” in the
People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Expectations
Mao was seen as a leader who had total control of the PRC and would frequently set the
country on new initiatives that often ended in disaster (Cheek, 2010). Additionally, Xi is seen as
a leader who has emerged as highly influential and has pushed the PRC away from a collective
leadership to more direct control (Li, 2016). Historically, Mao believed in the effectiveness of
his initiatives and asked for little advice when making decisions (Cheek, 2010). Xi has also
shown a high level of confidence in new initiatives and has maneuvered to put himself in more
control of the functions of the government, giving him the ability to have the final say on a
variety of topics (Li, 2016).
These leaders are both seen as promoting the completion of tasks to further their political
goals rather than building relationships in the government or among the people. They are also
seen as highly nationalistic, working to protect and expand the PRC’s place in the world, and as
biased toward the majority Han ethnicity. Finally, they are seen as leaders who are not likely to
trust others especially those who could be seen as competitors for power (Cheek, 2010; Li,
2016).
At the onset of this study, the primary expectation was that Mao and Xi would have high
scores for belief in ability to control events (BACE) and the need for power (PWR). These
leaders are seen as individuals that are motivated by seeking power and are highly self-assured in
their ability to control events. Additionally, it was expected that Mao and Xi would score high on
self-confidence (SC) and towards the moderate range for conceptual complexity (CC). The final
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expectation was that Mao and Xi would be focused on tasks over building relationships (TASK),
would work to protect their In-group (IGB), and would be highly distrustful of others (DIS).
Profiles
According to the results of the LTA for Mao Zedong, he is seen as a leader who respects
the constraints of his environment. Based on the analysis, Mao had low levels in his belief that
he can control events and in his need for power, indicating that he would be more likely to
respect the limitations that are imposed on him. Exhibiting these traits, according to LTA, we
could expect Mao to be likely to see the world as a place that cannot directly be shaped and will
often rely on others. Having a low score in PWR, suggests that a leader like Mao will be more
likely to allow others to share leadership, then to want to have complete control over the whole
process.
Leaders who have similar scores to Mao are more open to information and tend to show a
pragmatic leadership style. They are sensitive to situations and will seek out information to come
to a decision on issues that arise. Leaders with similar scores to Mao will seek out a high level of
information before making a decision on an issue and will look to others to assist in determining
the best course of action in certain situations, but in other situations they may see themselves as
more self-confident and will seek out less information.
According to LTA, Mao’s motivation is dependent on the situation; in some situations he
would likely be motivated by solving problems, and in others he is motivated by building
relationships. Mao’s motivation is dependent on the situation and can change depending on what
will award him with the best outcome overall. Leaders showing leadership traits similar to Mao
are not likely to favor one group over another; rather they will see the world as fluid and will be
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less likely to use scapegoats. Finally, Mao shows a higher level of distrust and leaders who score
similarly are more likely to distrust others in certain situations, but not consistently.
The closer examination of key speeches paints a different picture than the LTA results.
Mao is commonly considered as a leader who held a wide amount of power and would continue
policies that he supported even if the actual results were lacking (Cheek, 2010). In the speeches
examined, Mao frequently talked about the continued struggle and revolution even after the CCP
victory. He suggests that all of the Chinese people would need to be ready for, and join in on, the
constant struggle ahead for the CCP. This approach was implemented during the Cultural
Revolution and the Great Leap Forward when Mao called on the citizens of China to work
toward his goals.
Mao’s task oriented nature came through in the speeches examined; they were normally
given with a focus on the task at hand and what his plan is to get results. A look at the history of
the leader shows that Mao frequently used scapegoats and blamed others when it served his
purposes, such as his attack on intellectuals and leftists. Mao regularly purged opposition inside
the party to hold onto power: his anointed second in command, Deng Xiaoping, was purged
twice (1969 and 1976), Liu Shaoqi, and Lin Biao were all purged by Mao during the Cultural
Revolution. When these individuals became too powerful Mao ousted them to keep his hold on
power. Mao also showed a heavy favoritism for the Han ethnic group, this was also the group
that he was a part of and other ethnic groups were not treated as equal to the Han group (Karl,
2010).
According to the LTA results for Xi Jinping, we would expect Xi to also respect the
constraints of the system on his position and is not likely to challenge them. Xi is not likely to
believe in his ability to control events nor is he likely to challenge others for power. He is likely
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to rely on others to accomplish tasks and is willing to share leadership with others. In the
speeches that were examined in more depth, Xi suggests that it will take all of the CCP
leadership to further advance the PRC. This is in line with someone who is not opposed to
sharing power with others and suggests that a consensus system would be the ideal form for this
leader. A closer look at the actions of Xi suggests that this may just be a rhetorical stance. Xi has
taken great strides to take direct control of as many processes as possible, chairing 12
committees in his first four years of leadership. This is significantly more than his predecessors,
each chairing only three to four committees. These titles were created quickly after Xi’s rise to
power and these newly formed committees have greatly centralized power under Xi. His efforts
have led to a less collaborative system, this can be seen in that fact that his premier Li Keqiang is
relatively unknown and Xi has created committees which take much of the premiers
responsibilities away and make it so Xi has control of those processes as well (Miller, 2014;
Miller, 2016; Lam, 2015; Li, 2016).
Based on the LTA results, Xi is open to information. He is more likely to be open to the
interests of others rather than operating for his own self interests. Xi is likely to seek out a lot of
information in some situations and less in others. He will also look to others frequently to
determine how to solve issues that arise, rarely relying on his personal opinion over the opinions
of others. Xi is also unlikely to favor a certain group over any other. The LTA results indicate
that Xi will switch between being motivated by solving problems and for building relationships.
This switch will depend on what will generate the most support for a certain situation. Finally, Xi
is not likely to be distrustful of others without a reasonable justification.
Xi’s speeches show this method as well, he spoke in general terms and only pushed
certain campaigns that were seen as important. Xi’s speeches suggest a more inclusive tone,
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especially when it comes to including more ethnic groups over the majority Han, Xi even
mentions that he hopes to “advance the lofty cause of peace and development of mankind” (Xi,
2015, pg. 45). With a closer look at Xi’s policy implementation shows that his actions do not
meet his rhetoric and in fact the Uyghur population has greatly suffered under the Xi
administration (Lam, 2015).
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign shows Xi’s justification for distrusting others; the
individuals who would be targeted for this are being accused of a crime and are not solely
targeted because of any other affiliation, at least on the surface. When Xi Jinping purged Bo
Xilai it was under the rationale that Bo was guilty of corruption. This may be true, but Bo’s
removal from power was seen as a consolidation of power for Xi. Bo was seen as loyal to a
previous administration and could have been a threat to Xi’s grasp on power in the country. Even
though there is reasoning for an action these actions are still taken due to a certain level of
distrust of others (Li, 2016).
Xi states that the party leaders need to do more to advance socialism in the PRC (Xi,
2015). Xi came into office with goals for the country and for his administration. This would be in
conflict with the LTA results and that Xi is a leader who believes that he can influence events
and has a strong desire for power. This is further shown in Xi’s protest of Hu Jintao trying to
hold onto the Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairmanship. Xi wanted to have full control
over the country and did not want to share this leadership with others (Lam, 2015; Li, 2016).
Similarities
As expected, Mao and Xi showed several similarities in their LTA results. Both leaders
showed mid-range scores for TASK (task focus). This indicates that both leaders would similarly
switch between initiatives which are focused on reaching a solution and those that are focused on
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building relationships. This focus would depend on the situation and what the leader perceives as
the most beneficial at the time (Hermann, 2003).
Mao and Xi both scored low to mid on BACE (belief in ability to control events) and
PWR. These results indicate that these leaders would accept being a part of a collective
leadership system and are not completely motivated by their desire to seek out positions of
power. These leaders are more likely to allow others to take the lead on different initiatives,
especially if they believe that others would be better suited to complete the task at hand
(Hermann, 2003). This result is challenged by many of these leaders’ actions and looking at the
historical record for these leaders indicates that they may have a higher motivation for power
than these results suggest.
Finally, the LTA results indicate that Mao and Xi have a low IGB. This indicates that
these leaders do not show a preference for the group that they identify with. This is also
contradicted by the historical record for these leaders. Mao often showed preference for the Han
group over others and a preference against intellectuals and leftists (Cheek, 2010). On this topic
Xi Jinping’s rhetoric is different from his actions and certain groups such as the Uyghurs have
suffered under his administration (Li, 2016).
The in-depth analysis of a sample of the speeches shows a minor similarity between the
two leaders. The speeches examined were given before each leader was beginning new
initiatives, such as Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and Mao’s Hundred Flower’s Campaign and
these speeches were given to gain public support. Additionally, both leaders frequently spoke
about the future of the PRC and how the Chinese people should prepare for these changes. This
is not surprising and logically these leaders would make addresses to announce new initiatives
and leaders often speak of unity for the future.

97

Differences
Contrary to expectations, the LTA results also show that Mao and Xi have several key
differences in leadership style. Mao scored higher on DIS (distrust), SC (self-confidence) and
CC (conceptual complexity) than Xi did. Mao scored in the moderate range for DIS while Xi
scored in the low range for this variable. This indicates that Mao would be more distrustful of
others than Xi and would be more willing to remove those that he saw as a threat to his power. In
Chinese politics we have observed this difference, Mao had multiple high level purges and Xi
has had far fewer with the only notable purge being of Bo Xilai at the start of his tenure (Cheek,
2010; Li, 2016). Mao’s higher score on SC indicates that he would be more willing to trust his
personal beliefs and Xi would be more likely to defer to others’ opinions than Mao. Finally, Mao
having a higher score in CC would indicate that Mao is more likely to seek out more information
on a topic before making a decision on a course of action (Hermann, 2003).
A closer examination of a sample of the speeches given by each of these leaders and the
context of each speech provides a fuller understanding of the motivations of these leaders.
Additionally, this examination provides a better understanding of the contextual differences
between Mao and Xi. The context of these speeches and the differences between the processes of
leadership in Mao and Xi’s eras are important in understanding the differences between these
two leaders.
Mao’s speeches directly reflect the difficulties of governing a newly formed country and
the distrust that comes from the uncertainty of war. Mao’s revolutionary character comes through
when he is addressing the people. He often speaks on the difficulties that the nation faces, the
constant state of revolution and the uncertainty of the PRC’s future. Mao’s speeches were often
delivered before beginning a large initiative and were given to gain public support of the new

98

movement (Cheek, 2010). Mao’s speeches indicate a clear distrust for dissent, often speaking of
those who would oppose the government, detailing his view that these people are enemies of the
PRC. Finally, Mao’s speeches show that he was quick to label groups of people, often to serve as
scapegoats or when he had something to gain from doing so.
Xi’s speeches paint a more optimistic picture. In the speeches examined, Xi speaks of the
potential for the future for the PRC and working with minority groups to reach this potential. Xi
emphasizes his main foci for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) such as his anti-corruption
campaign and the idea of rejuvenating the “Chinese Dream.” The major themes of these
speeches are unity, cooperation and moving forward with new ideas. Xi’s stresses the importance
of the work of the previous leaders and how the new administration can build off of those old
ideas.
Analysis
Contrary to initial expectations, this study has shown key differences between Mao
Zedong and Xi Jinping. Mao was a revolutionary leader during a time of uncertainty for the CCP
and the PRC and his methods and approaches to leadership were different from Xi’s, at least in
part due to the fact that the times that these leaders were a part of called for different approaches.
Mao was a leader who came to power during a period of poverty, instability and war.
Conversely, Xi came to power during China’s re-emergence, with a strong understanding of
politics and an ability to maneuver complex political situations and he shows signs of continually
doing so throughout his leadership. This is an important difference between these leaders, Mao
was a revolutionary and Xi is a bureaucrat. These leaders came to power under different
circumstances and they continue to hold power utilizing different methods that they developed
with their different backgrounds. This change is not just found at the highest office, but
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throughout the CCP. Since Deng Xiaoping’s time as “Core Leader” the CCP leadership, under
Deng’s direction, shed its revolutionary skin and began to accept the “technocrats” into
leadership positions. These individuals, who began their careers as engineers or scientists before
becoming politicians, have changed the face of politics in the PRC. This has shifted the CCP
from being led by charismatic revolutionary leaders, with minimal scholarly training, to being
led by those with higher levels of education and training. This shift in the background of leaders
highlights a shift towards basing government initiatives on different ideas that may be based in
fact over one single person’s opinion (Li, 2016).
This analysis showed key differences between Mao and Xi. The LTA results showed that
Mao was more distrustful of others than Xi. Mao was also seen as more self-confident and higher
in conceptual complexity than Xi. This indicates that Mao was more likely to seek out
information and to be more confident in the decisions that he makes. According to the LTA
results, Xi would be more likely to allow others to make decisions and is likely to base his
decisions on the opinions of others. This is in line with the idea that Xi serves in a collective
leadership and is more open to allowing others to share leadership. Although the LTA results
were indicative of Xi preferring to share leadership, there is no evidence that this is really
happening and in fact there is strong evidence that the opposite is true and that his premier Li
Keqiang is a relative unknown figure and the current administration is referred to as the Xi
administration and not the Xi/Li administration unlike the previous administrations (Lam, 2015;
Li, 2016).
These leaders, surprisingly, both scored low on the need for power. The expectation for
this result is that these leaders have a strong desire for power as a main motivating factor, but the
results of the LTA indicate that holding power is not a high priority. This indicates that even
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Mao was not directly motivated by obtaining power, this does not hold up to a historical analysis
of this leader’s behavior. Mao had several periods where he was not in direct control, but he
always fought to return to power (Cheek, 2010; Karl, 2010). This would indicate that Mao has a
much higher desire for power than the LTA analysis showed.
The analysis of a sample of speeches from each leader adds to this comparison. The
speeches and their contexts highlight key differences between these two leaders. The speeches
analyzed show a difference in tone and themes which indicates different styles of leadership
between the two leaders. Mao’s speeches indicate that the struggle of revolution will continue,
while Xi’s speeches are, in many ways, optimistic for the future. Mao’s speeches were optimistic
in the sense that he saw revolution as a worthy endeavor and even glorified violence making
these speeches optimistic that the Chinese people can continue their revolution indefinitely. Mao
speaks out on intellectuals and their influence on opposing the CCP and Xi speaks of
intellectuals helping to advance socialism with Chinese characteristics (Mao, 1977; Xi, 2015).
Additionally, the context of these speeches is dramatically different. Mao gave his speeches
during a time of revolution and highlighted the struggles that a newly formed country face. Xi
faces the needs of a country that is coming to prominence in the international community and
who needs to find a balance between the CCP and those that may oppose it, such as minority
groups (Cheek, 2010; Li, 2016).
The longevity of Mao’s time as the “Core Leader” (1949-1976) may have had an effect
on the outcome of the study. Mao was in power for over four decades and had given more
speeches than Xi, for this research Mao had 167 speeches and Xi had 79. This provides a far
better insight into the effects of Mao’s campaigns; these have been researched heavily over the
years since his death in 1976. On the other hand, Xi has only been the Core Leader for a short
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time and has given a limited number of speeches. Xi’s initiatives are just starting and it is
difficult to determine the effects they are having. This makes it difficult to compare these two
leaders.
This research had several limitations that may have affected the final outcome. One
limitation that may have affected the LTA results are the speeches examined. The materials
analyzed in this study were official translations of the speeches, translated and released by the
Chinese government. This helps in determining the validity of the translations, but due to the fact
that these are government released they may not be a direct representation of what was said at
the time. Instead, these works may have been edited to change the tone or meaning of the speech
to accomplish a political purpose. This is a common practice in politics and is not specifically
unique to China, but it does limit the validity of the current study. Further, these collections were
compiled and released to serve a purpose; the speeches were collected and distributed as a form
of unapologetic propaganda for the CCP. Understanding the motivations behind these
collections’ existence shows directly one of the limits of this study.
The best results from LTA happen when the results of scripted speeches can be compared
to spontaneous materials, from interviews or other events where the leader is not simply reading
a prepared speech. Even in a growingly transparent world the PRC has been able to maintain
significant control over the media and the information is released to the public. Due to the nature
of the Chinese regime these spontaneous moments are not likely to happen and this important
information is not available to include in the final analysis.
Conclusions
The results of this study suggest that comparing leaders from dramatically different time
periods, under separate circumstances and with increasing restrictions on leadership is a difficult
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task and one that should not be taken lightly. It is difficult to say that a modern leader and a
revolutionary leader can be accurately compared. The differences in restrictions that are created
as a country progresses, especially restrictions from the international community, can make
comparing leaders from separate time periods increasingly problematic.
This research utilizes several approaches to compare Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping. The
LTA results indicate that Mao and Xi have different leadership styles, but also show results that
are surprising when compared to the historical context. This doesn’t necessarily indicate that the
LTA was incorrect, but that the rhetoric that is being used doesn’t hold up with the actual policy
that is implemented. Xi scores low in IGB, but the policy that is implemented is harsh toward
non-Han groups. This indicates that these methods need to be used in conjunction with other
methods to get the fullest analysis possible.
To say that Xi is the strongest Chinese leader since Mao is an acceptable and largely
accurate statement (Lam, 2015; Li, 2016). But, to say that Xi Jinping is the “new” Mao Zedong
is an irresponsible comparison. This comparison paints a picture that does not hold up to reality.
The truth of the matter is Xi and Mao are two strong leaders for different reasons and in
drastically different times. When Mao died, in 1976, Deng Xiaoping created institutional norms
within the CCP to make it difficult for another leader like Mao to come to power. Through
further institutionalization and an increased role in the international community, the individual
leader of the PRC has many limitations to their actions (Li, 2016).
When Mao unilaterally announced victory over the Kuomintang (KMT) and declared the
formation of the PRC, in 1949, he was doing so after a period of prolonged war and during a
time of global insecurity and instability. During this time and the period immediately after the
PRC was largely separated from the international community, and Mao was able to run the
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country with few limitations on his power. Since Mao’s time as “Core Leader” the PRC has
become increasingly integrated into the international community and has seen institutional
changes and increases on limitations to the power of the position of “Core Leader.” These
institutional changes have indeed made it increasingly difficult for a leader to wield the amount
of power that Chairman Mao held. Xi Jinping could very well be the strongest leader since Mao,
but the limitations to the position and the changes to Chinese society make directly comparing
the leaders less important than what other assessments could reveal.
Xi is missing several leadership characteristics which would place him in the same level
of leadership as Mao Zedong. Xi is not a revolutionary leader nor does he have scores of
dedicated followers who are willing to blindly follow him. Mao was able to be an effective
leader because of his military background, he brought the CCP to power and the early success of
the PRC was attributed solely to his leadership. With the victory over the KMT, Mao was given
a “cult of personality” that allowed for him to gain instantaneous support for any movement that
he desired. Xi does not have these key characteristics and without them he has to be much more
political and he needs to rely on other leaders to help support his ideas. This reflects the needs of
a collective leadership system and shows the main differences between Mao and Xi (Li, 2016).
Mao’s China was a country with little contact with the outside world. In the decades since
Mao the leaders of the PRC have worked to open China to the international community. Due to
this, Xi is not operating in a bubble like Mao was and if Xi were to perform movements similar
to Mao’s Great Leap Forward, resulting in the death of unknown millions of citizens, it is likely
that this action would gain international attention. Mao was able to get away with harming so
many citizens due in part to the closed nature of the country at the time. If Xi were to perform
similar actions it would not go unnoticed in the international community and could possibly hurt

104

the PRC’s standing in the world. A leader of modern day China does not have the luxury of not
considering the international response to an action and with the PRC being more economically
dependent on other countries it becomes more difficult to take actions that may have a negative
impact on the economy of the PRC and of other countries (Karl, 2010; Lam, 2015; Li, 2016).
These international limitations make it increasingly difficult for a leader of the PRC to be as
powerful as Mao was.
The common thought is that after a successful rise to the top and a rapid consolidation of
power Xi Jinping has emerged as a dictator to the likes of Mao Zedong. This belief is one which
would cause decision makers around the global to be weary of the new Chinese leader, but this
statement falls short of the reality of the situation. In the current system, Xi has certainly
emerged as a strong leader and he is unlikely to let opportunities to advance the Chinese nation
slip past him. Even with Xi being a strong leader of the PRC it is important to note that Xi is not
capable of undoing the decades of institutionalization and norm building that the CCP has
undertaken to get to this point. Xi Jinping will continue to be a part of a collective leadership
country and will continue to feel the limitations that were built by Deng Xiaoping to ensure that
a single leader of the PRC could not wield as much power as Mao Zedong did (Li, 2016). These
institutional norms will be tested during the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, when Xi’s
successor should become clear to outside analysts. If no front runner exists after this meeting it
may indicate that Xi will attempt to hold on to power longer than the retirement norm of two
five-year terms.
The important implications of this research are that Xi is a strong leader, but he is not the
new Mao. This indicates that policy makers should treat Xi as a leader who understands how to
maneuver through the political landscape of the international community, but should be able to
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work with him in ways that they would not have been able to with Mao. Mao was a heavily
nationalistic person and believed in separating China from the outside world, often being critical
of foreign countries involvement in the PRC. Xi, being different from Mao, looks to work with
other countries to develop positive relationships. The differences between Xi and Mao are
positive for the stability of the region and for international cooperation.
This research has implications outside of the context of the PRC as well. Modern leaders
are often compared to leaders of the past, either positively or negatively, and these comparisons
have limitations. These comparisons can be critical for drawing attention to important issues, but
these comparisons are difficult. Leaders are impacted by their personalities and traits, but also by
the context of the different systems the leaders were a part of. The changes in domestic, regional
and the international systems can impact how leaders act and make it difficult to compare leaders
from different time periods, who may have had different restrictions. These comparisons can be
difficult but they are also valuable and it is important to understand that all the tools at a
researcher’s disposal need to be utilized to make sure the analysis is as complete as possible to
get the most meaningful results.
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Appendix

Leadership
Trait Analysis

Coding schemes for Leadership Trait Analysis, Margaret G. Hermann's seven traits used in the assessment
of leadership style: belief in ability to control events, need for power, conceptual complexity, selfconfidence, task orientation, distrust, and in-group bias.
Spanish language coding schemes are provided courtesy of M. Consuelo Thiers.
Unless otherwise requested, the LTA Classic coding scheme will be provided. This is the reference version
for most academic research.

Conceptual
Complexity

Degree of differentiation which the author shows in describing or discussing other people, places, policies,
ideas, or things. Coding for conceptual complexity focuses on particular words that suggest the author can
see different dimensions in the environment and words that indicate the author sees only a few categories
along which to classify objects and ideas. Examples of words that are suggestive of high conceptual
complexity include: approximately, possibility, trend, and for example.
Examples of words that are suggestive of of low conceptual complexity include: absolutely, without a doubt,
certainly, and irreversible.

Belief in
Control Over
Events

Degree of control the author perceives over the situations the author is in; there is a perception that
individuals, groups, organizations and governments can influence what happens. Coding for belief in control
over events focuses on verbs. It is assumed that when people take responsibility for planning or initiating an
action, they believe that they have some control over what happens. Action proposed or taken by the author
or a group with whom he or she identifies indicates belief in control over events.

SelfConfidence

The author's sense of self-importance,or image of his or her ability to cope adequately with objects and
persons in the environment. Coding for self-confidence focuses on the pronouns “my,” “myself,” “I,”
“me,”and “mine.” When the use of the pronoun reflects that the speaker: is instigating an activity (for
example, “I am going to . . .,” “That is my plan of action”), should be viewed as an authority figure on this
issue (for example, “If it were up to me . . .,” “Let me explain what we mean”), or is the recipient of a
positive response from another person or group (for example, “You flatter me with your praise,” “My
position was accepted”) self-confidence is indicated.

Task
Orientation

The author's relative emphasis on interactions with others when dealing problems as opposed to focusing on
the feelings and needs of relevant and important constituents. Coding for task orientation, attention focuses
on words that indicate work on a task or instrumental activity as well as words that center around concern
for another’s feelings, desires, and satisfaction. For example, accomplishment, achieve(ment), plan,
position, proposal, recommendation, and tactic are task-oriented, whilst appreciation, amnesty,
collaboration, disappoint(ment), forgive(ness), harm, liberation, suffering are group maintenance words.

Distrust

Wariness about others or the degree of the author's inclination to suspect the motives and actions of others.
Coding for distrust focuses on references persons other than the leader and to groups other than those with
whom the leader identifies that convey distrust, doubt, misgivings or concern about what these persons or
groups are doing.

In-Group Bias

A view of the world in which one’s own group (social, political, ethnic, etc) holds center stage, is perceived
as the best, and/or there are strong emotional attachments to this in-group. Coding for in-group bias
focuses on words or phrases referring to the author’s own group that: are favorable (for example, “great,”
“peace-loving,” progressive,” “successful,” “prosperous”); suggest strength (for example, “powerful,”
“capable,” “made great advances,” “has boundless resources”); or indicate the need to maintain group
honor and identity (for example, “need to defend firmly our borders,” “must maintain our own
interpretation,” “decide our own policies”).

Need for
Power

Degree of author's concern for establishing, maintaining, or restoring one’s power or, in other words, the
desire to control, influence, or have an impact on other persons or groups. Coding for need for power
focuses on verbs where the author (1) proposes or engages in a strong, forceful action such as an assault or
attack, a verbal threat, an accusation, or a reprimand; (2) gives advice or assistance when it is not solicited;
(3) attempts to regulate the behavior of another person or group; (4) tries to persuade, bribe, or argue with
someone else so long as the concern is not to reach agreement or avoid disagreement; (5) endeavors to
impress or gain fame with an action; or (6) is concerned with his or her reputation or position.

